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ABSTRACT 
 
Risk Measures Constituting Risk Metrics for Decision Making in the Chemical Process 
Industry. (December 2010) 
Katherine Priya Prem, BS., Texas A&M University 
 Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Sam Mannan 
 
The occurrence of catastrophic incidents in the process industry leave a marked 
legacy of resulting in staggering economic and societal losses incurred by the company, 
the government and the society. The work described herein is a novel approach proposed 
to help predict and mitigate potential catastrophes from occurring and for understanding 
the stakes at risk for better risk informed decision making.  
The methodology includes societal impact as risk measures along with tangible 
asset damage monetization. Predicting incidents as leading metrics is pivotal to 
improving plant processes and, for individual and societal safety in the vicinity of the 
plant (portfolio). From this study it can be concluded that the comprehensive judgments 
of all the risks and losses should entail the analysis of the overall results of all possible 
incident scenarios. Value-at-Risk (VaR) is most suitable as an overall measure for many 
scenarios and for large number of portfolio assets. FN-curves and F$-curves can be 
correlated and this is very beneficial for understanding the trends of historical incidents 
in the U.S. chemical process industry.  
 iv 
Analyzing historical databases can provide valuable information on the incident 
occurrences and their consequences as lagging metrics (or lagging indicators) for the 
mitigation of the portfolio risks. From this study it can be concluded that there is a strong 
statistical relationship between the different consequence tiers of the safety pyramid and 
Heinrich‘s safety pyramid is comparable to data mined from the HSEES database. 
Furthermore, any chemical plant operation is robust only when a strategic balance is 
struck between optimal plant operations and, maintaining health, safety and sustaining 
environment.  
The balance emerges from choosing the best option amidst several conflicting 
parameters. Strategies for normative decision making should be utilized for making 
choices under uncertainty. Hence, decision theory is utilized here for laying the 
framework for choice making of optimum portfolio option among several competing 
portfolios. For understanding the strategic interactions of the different contributing 
representative sets that play a key role in determining the most preferred action for 
optimum production and safety, the concepts of game theory are utilized and framework 
has been provided as novel application to chemical process industry.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Importance of Research 
Man has been analyzing risk since time immemorial. Whether a decision is to be 
made in a simple case of crossing the street or a complex case of shutting down a 
chemical plant, accurate risk analysis is inherently necessary. In the past, however, 
improper risk analysis and/or the lack of understanding of the stakes at risk have resulted 
in many major catastrophes. Some examples of major catastrophic incidents with huge 
economic and societal losses within the U.S. are: a) the Phillips explosion in Pasadena 
Texas in 1989 which resulted in 23 fatalities, 314 injuries and over $715 million losses 
(Lepkowski, 1989), b) the Texas City disaster of 1947 which resulted in 4,000 deaths 
and cost an estimated $75mil in 1947 dollars (Stephens, 1997), and c) the BP Texas City 
refinery incident of 2005 which is estimated as the most costly incident in recent times 
with a loss of $2 billion while fatally injuring 15 workers and injuring another 70 
workers (Baker et al. panel report, 2007). The recent BP-Transocean Deepwater Horizon 
incident caused by the failure of the blowout preventer could become the most costly 
incident to date. All these estimations of loss are due to damages to the facility, with loss 
of turnover and business interruption (Mannan, 2005).  
Catastrophes are high profile incidents that, although have low probability of 
occurrence, almost always result in huge financial losses to the company in terms of both  
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the loss of assets in the plant and the adverse societal impacts (i.e., fatalities, injuries). 
For example, the Texas City disaster of 1947, due to the Grandcamp ship explosion 
which was hauling ammonium nitrate, is considered ―the worst disaster, resulting in the 
largest number of casualties, in American history‖ (Stephens, 1997).  The Red Cross and 
the Texas Department of Public Safety estimated that approximately 4,000 people were 
negatively impacted by this incident. There were over 468 fatalities with another 100 
persons missing and 3,500 injured. The estimated present value property losses of this 
catastrophe are about $700 million, not including the 1.5 million barrels of petroleum 
which can be estimated at an additional present value of $3.5 billion. There are other 
several major incidents such as the Flixborough Incident in UK (1974), the Bhopal Gas 
Tragedy (1984), the Piper Alpha Incident (1989) and more recently the Buncefield 
Incident (2005) (Mannan, 2005, BMIIB, 2008) which also have resulted in staggering 
economic loss and negative societal impact. Most often major regulations result from 
understanding the causes of such catastrophes. Hence, predicting these catastrophes 
before they actually occur would be very useful. 
From historical incidents it can be concluded that deviations from normal 
operating procedures and a series of failures, equipment operations and/or human error, 
almost always result in catastrophes leading to huge financial losses to the companies. 
The losses are incurred because of structural damages, fatalities and injuries. Although 
rare events, because catastrophic incidents result in extreme losses, it is significantly 
important to study them and incorporate suitable methodology to provide both leading 
indicators and lagging indicators (or metrics) to boost safer operations and prevent future 
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catastrophes. Having a good framework for determining the leading indicators for 
potential incidents is pivotal to aid in understanding the risks in order to prevent major 
catastrophes. Incorporating lagging indicators which will provide information about the 
previous incident trends in the process industry will also enable the understanding of the 
stakes at risk. If the portfolio risks leading to potential catastrophic losses and the 
lagging indicators are both studied collectively, then it aids in providing the complete 
picture for understanding the severity of the stakes at risk. Such information will be very 
beneficial for decision makers and regulators to make suitable risk-informed decisions 
by establishing proper risk reduction measures. 
The advantages of performing a risk analysis are many. AIChE/CCPS (2000), 
and Pasman et al. (2009) have stressed the utility of performing quantitative risk analysis 
in order to improve process safety. However, for typical industrial plants, the number of 
risk values that result from a full-fledged quantitative risk analysis pertaining to different 
potential incident scenarios could range from hundreds to thousands. There is, therefore, 
a need to develop a framework or a methodology to fully understand the risk values 
resulting from quantitative risk analysis (QRA) studies.  
Presently, the ever increasing complexities in the chemical process industry 
emphasize the serious need for a complete risk analysis of entire plant portfolios 
(including both tangible and intangible assets). However, loss expenses from 
catastrophes as seen from the examples are only calculated after the incident has already 
occurred. If the incidents and their expected losses are calculated at the time of 
performing the risk analysis, then the decision maker is provided with more useful 
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information for making risk informed decisions which are less subjective as opposed to 
risk-based decision making, which is currently the norm. Hence, the need for making a 
business case for improving the process safety is critical in understanding the stakes at 
risk. Therefore, estimating the loss expenses in monetary terms, which is based on good 
scientific basis, to enable management and regulators to better understand the portfolio 
risks for making sound risk-informed decisions for the safety of the chemical plants, is 
extremely important.  
For understanding the stakes at risk comprehensively, an approach for expressing 
risks as a broad set of measures is needed. This approach forming a metrics should 
include factors such as the prediction of potential accidents, the proper representation of 
all the stakes at risk, the overall cost benefit analysis (CBA) for the portfolio as a whole, 
the identification of the most risky scenarios with a potential to lead to catastrophes and 
capturing historical incident trends from the US process industry. The risk analysis and 
the estimation of losses of potential catastrophes serve as leading indicators and the 
historical trends of incidents serve as the lagging indicators. A methodology which 
would include important and highly relevant information projected to indicate future 
potential incidents as well as utilize the historical process industry trends would not only 
increase the safe operations of the plant but, also increase the productivity by improving 
all the processes during the life cycle of the plant.  
Amidst all the information provided by the leading indicators and the lagging 
indicators, it is also crucial to provide decision makers with the tools to help choose the 
safest portfolio options from various portfolio options. The portfolio options could be 
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different process designs at the initial design phase of projects, different equipment that 
need to be installed in already existing plant during management of change a plant with a 
neighborhood in its vicinity and so on. The area of decision making for improving safety 
and ensuring optimum production has not previously been studied in the field of 
chemical engineering. Including a framework for this along with the leading and lagging 
indicator information would fully enable decision makers to make risk-informed 
decisions for safer operations and prevent future catastrophes.  
1.2. Problem Statement 
Major accidents and concerns for improving safety have resulted in the 
establishment of regulatory bodies such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) in the U.S. and Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK. 
These agencies are commissioned to regulate and inspect for safety standards to prevent 
accidents and ensure public safety. The company managements - which make key 
business decisions directly affecting the safety of chemical plants and, the regulatory 
bodies, rely heavily on risk analyses to make sound risk-informed decisions for safer 
plant operations. Management and regulators use QRA to evaluate risks and penalize 
companies violating safety regulations, to identify areas of the plant for cost effective 
risk mitigation and, to set up safety standards for plant operations. Quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) is one of the most rational methods to obtain information on potential 
risks of accidents in the chemical process industry (Royal Society, 1983; CCPS, 2000). 
However, understanding the stakes at risk and making business decisions for improved 
safety is lacking. Additionally, the decisions made by company managements and 
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standards set by regulatory bodies are often times highly subjective and ‗risk-based‘ 
rather than ‗risk-informed‘. 
For larger plants, the number of scenarios can be about a thousand or more. If 
QRA is performed for public safety purposes, the impact to society, i.e. the intangible 
risks and disruptions, are determined and usually expressed as the number of fatalities. 
However, for internal safety examination and business decisions, possible tangible 
property damages, as well as intangible losses such as injuries and fatality are also very 
relevant. For prevention measures, prioritization is unavoidable. There is a need to fully 
understand the overall risk values for sound business decisions for promoting safety 
while abating the risks.  
The importance of quantitative risk assessment to identify the potential incidents 
and their consequences is exemplified in the complex chemical industry processes. Once 
the risks of the potential incidents are quantified, the challenging task of correctly 
estimating the stakes at risk and choosing the safest alternative still persists. The 
approach for solving this problem is to monetize the portfolio risks in addition to the 
traditional expression of risk in terms of the probability of fatalities.  
There is currently limited scope and insufficient information for decision making 
in the chemical process industry. So, in the chemical process industry, the following 
problems persist: a) The inclusion of societal risk is lacking. Major accidents have a 
significant negative impact outside the plant facility and hence including the negative 
societal impact is significantly important. It is widely accepted that the consideration of 
intangible (societal) risk is crucial to estimate the overall portfolio risks (HSE, 1989). 
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However, much research is needed to capture and quantify societal risks, b) The risk 
representation in terms of entire distribution is lacking, c) The economic loss estimation 
to obtain the maximum possible losses for worst case scenarios is also lacking. The 
knowledge of the entire damage-loss distribution in monetary terms, such that it pertains 
to all scenarios, to obtain valuable insight for better understanding of risks and decision 
making is also required. Furthermore, at present decisions made after performing the risk 
analysis are highly subjective. Decisions made based on incomplete understanding could 
result in major catastrophes as seen from historical incidents in process industry.  
Therefore, the focus of this work is to address the four fold problems depicted in 
Fig 1. Firstly, it is difficult to predict scenarios for complex portfolios because proper 
risk assessment had to be done to consider all credible scenarios for mitigation of risk. 
Once the risks of the potential incidents are quantified, the challenging task of correctly 
understanding the stakes at risk by choosing the safest alternative still remains. 
Secondly, there is no systematic method to monetize and represent all risks. Hence there 
is a need for the systematic inclusion of potential negative impact of the tangible and 
intangible (societal) risks of a portfolio. Thirdly, there is a need for a quantitative risk 
assessment based tool to help understand the stakes at risk with a combination of both 
leading indicators and lagging indicators. Fourthly, there is a need for a framework to 
help decision makers make better risk-informed decision making.    
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Figure 1. Research problems for establishing research objectives 
 
 
If the research problems stated in this section are addressed, it will greatly benefit 
the chemical process industry management and regulators in estimating risks of complex 
chemical processes, obtain the stakes at risk in monetary terms, represent the risks in 
understandable manner while including both tangible and intangible risks for improving 
process safety and preventing major industry catastrophes. Such methodology will prove 
to be a powerful tool in the process industry where none exists today. Section 2 will 
provide the background information of all the different concepts utilized in this research. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK 
 
In order to address the problems stated in Section 1, concepts from different 
fields of study have been compiled to develop the proposed research methodology. 
Previously, limited work exists in this area of study. This section, therefore, focuses on 
introducing all concepts with previous work for outlining the gaps in previous research 
and in making a business case for process safety. 
2.1. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) 
The most important step in understanding the stakes at risks for potential 
incidents of portfolio is performing the QRA. Fig. 2 shows the different aspects that 
constitute QRA in chemical process industry (CCPS, 2000; Crowl & Louvar, 2002).
  
 
Figure 2. Steps for estimating total portfolio risk 
 
Probability
• FTA, ETA
• Scenario 
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Consequence
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In the chemical industry, the task of managing risks is challenging and one must 
know about all the risks involved. Quantitative risk assessment has been established as 
one of the effective methodology for studying risks in the process industry (Stallen, 
Greets and Vrijling, 1996; Pasman, 2003; Wang.Y, 2005). Much emphasis has been 
placed on the accurate quantification of the risks in chemical process industry. QRA 
gives the measure of risk in terms of the probability of occurrence of an undesired event 
along with its potential consequences in terms of fatalities, injuries and property losses 
(AIChE/CCPS, 1994; AIChE/CCPS, 1996; AIChE/CCPS, 1999). Quantitative risk 
analysis originated in the nuclear industry and is now also widely used in the electronics 
industry, aviation industry, civil engineering, chemical process industry and more 
recently in biotechnology. QRA is an effective method to quantify the portfolio risks 
(AIChE/CCPS, 2000; Pasman et al., 2009; Prem, Ng, Sawyer et al., 2010). 
In the world of complex chemical processing, the application of quantitative risk 
assessment methods to identify the potential accidents and their consequences is 
exemplified as a suitable means for studying the risks. This is because both the hazards 
and their consequences are quantified in a QRA study. In the chemical industry, 
quantitative risk assessments consider primarily the damages incurred by explosion, fire 
and toxic dispersion. Equation 1 provides the general form of process risk from 
quantitative risk assessment method as a function of scenario(s), consequence (c) and 
frequency (f).   
 Risk = F(s, c, f)     (1) 
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QRA follows after a preliminary qualitative or semi-qualitative process hazard 
analysis (PHA) step such as the HAZOP, What-If analysis or Bow-Tie analysis. The 
probabilities of occurrences of the deduced credible scenarios are determined next using 
methodologies such as the fault tree analysis (FTA) and the event tree analysis (ETA) 
(AIChE/CCPS,2000; Crowl & Louvar, 2002). Evaluating the scenario frequencies of 
credible scenarios using FTA will also enable determining the minimum cutsets which 
are the sequence of events that would have to fail in order to lead to the potential 
incident. The top event occurrence probability or frequency of potential incidents for 
each section of the plant can be calculated. In the chemical process industry, the failure 
of series of equipment and human error are leading causes for process industry incidents 
(Mannan, 2005). Hence, equipment reliability information such as the failure rate date, 
the mean time to failure, the mean time to repair and mean time to testing, are utilized in 
order to calculate the top event frequency of potential incidents in the FTA method.  
Probability estimation for potential incidents using ETA is generally based on historical 
information, reliability information and expert opinion. Consequences are estimated 
using source and consequence modeling (Wilson, 1995; AIChE/CCPS, 1999; Crowl & 
Louvar, 2002; Mannan, 2005). 
    The basic thermodynamic, reaction kinetics and transport phenomenon are utilized 
to model the type of release of chemicals or loss of containment in case of incidents. The 
amount of chemical released and the characteristics of the release can be estimated using 
source models. From source and consequence models developed for different physical 
phenomenon of releases, values such as the amount of liquid lost during release, the type 
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of dispersion, the overpressures generated in case of explosions, the heat radiation in 
case of fires and, the type of structural damage and harm to people can be estimated. 
Based on overpressures generated and the heat radiation impingement, probit models 
(Crowl & Louvar, 2002) can be utilized to estimate structural damage to equipment 
within plant and structural damage outside plant facility. In addition, the type of societal 
damage such as lung damage, injuries and number of fatalities can also be estimated 
based on overpressure calculations using probit models (Crowl & Louvar, 2002).   
Utilizing the principles of QRA helps identify all the possible scenarios that 
could lead to potential incidents along with their consequences. Therefore, the results of 
a QRA study are utilized by the company management to make business decisions 
during installation of new facilities, for land use planning and for the implementation of 
suitable safety measures for risk mitigation. Regulatory bodies also utilize the results of 
QRA to establish new regulations in the process industry (HSE RR703, 2009). 
Nevertheless, QRA has limitations in that there is a vast number of data generated as 
results from the assessment which must all be adequately analyzed. Properly 
understanding the stakes at risk following the QRA study could serve as leading 
indicators for safety related decisions to avoid major accidents.  
Khan, Sadiq and Husain (2002) consider process operations to be the most 
hazardous activity after transportation and drilling operations in an offshore oil and gas 
facility. Khan, Sadiq and Husain state that oil and gas platform operational eventualities 
can be avoided by incorporating proper control measures in the early design stages. The 
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authors describe a methodology or risk based process safety decision making for various 
process units such as separators and compressors. 
The authors mention that any offshore facility is never fully safe because of the 
innumerable risks associated with it but safety can be heightened by optimum design 
configuration during the installation process. The aim is to reduce the risk to a level 
which is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) while also not going over the 
budget.  In order to effectively find a middle optimum ground to address this problem of 
cost and benefit, there is a need for QRA. The authors recommend the use of QRA 
techniques early on in the project life cycle ideally because at this stage it is possible to 
have better engineering judgment to identify the major risks and ―loss prevention 
expenditure‖ can be ―targeted in areas where there is little benefit.‖ This will prevent 
expensive remedial measures from being taken in the later life cycle of the oil and gas 
platform and its operation. Khan et al., also utilize quantitative risk assessment methods 
for the safety design measures based on a feedback system of using fault tree for credible 
accidents.  
Hasle, Kjelle`n and Haugerud (2008) indicate that the Norwegian offshore 
facilities have the most experience and know-how in preventing accidents through the 
design and implementation of good QRA methodologies. Hasle et al. study the 
principles used by the industry at different phases of design in two ways, namely, the 
human centered and the energy barrier perspectives. The human centered perspective 
focuses on the design of work place environment to enable the operators to function at 
an optimal level by minimizing the human errors and mitigating disturbances i.e., safety 
 14 
is chief aspect of initial integral design. The human aspect for operational safety is a 
more demanding task and harder to demonstrate. However, it is being increasingly used 
while considering offshore oil and gas operation in the offshore industry, i.e., safety is 
included as an add-on characteristic but not in combination for decision making.  
This work addresses the process industry incidents with major loss potential. 
General health and well being of the workers are also considered. At each level safety 
aspects are reviewed to reduce the uncertainty due to feasibility of selected solutions to 
meet the basic regulatory and company specific requirements. Based on QRA studies, 
regulators and company management utilize risk curves which provide information 
about societal consequences. 
2.1.1. Risk curves 
In the Netherlands, the societal risk (SR) criteria is based on the probability of 
death caused by accidents for individuals and for the whole exposed population 
(Roodbol, 1998). Some useful definitions put forth by the authors are: 
a) Individual risk (IR): Probability (frequency/year) that any one member of the 
general public, present 24 hrs per day and unprotected at a certain distance from 
the industrial activity, will be killed as a result of an accident at that activity. 
b) Societal risk (SR): SR is defined as the relationship between the number of 
people killed in a single accident and the probability that this number will be 
exceeded. 
Societal risk and the concept of risk aversion by Vrijling and van Gelder (1989) 
presents FN-curve as an accepted and fairly accurate description of  the societal risk in 
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order to communicate societal risk with the public and the decision makers. Vriling and 
van Gelder (1989) also agree that ―risk should at least be judged from two points of 
view‖, the individual level and the societal level, both of which can be clearly seen from 
FN-curves.  
2.1.2. FN-curves 
A complete portfolio risk assessment will result in large number of frequencies 
and consequence information which must be represented in a systematic and relatively 
easy to understand manner (Stallen, Geerts and Vrijling, 1996). FN-curves are important 
types of farmer‘s curves or risk curves used for land use planning and licensing 
(Modarres, 2004; HSE, 1989). Generally, from the risk curves, it can be understood that 
the impact to the society (societal risk aversion) by a disaster increases sharply with the 
increase in the total number of victims. Societal or group risk, provides a measure for 
this disruption.  
Performing QRA provides values for potential societal risks in terms of the 
number of fatalities (N) following an accident and the frequency of its occurrence (f) or 
cumulative frequencies (F).  A suitable representation of societal risk is FN-curves 
(Evans and Verlander, 1997).  Hirst (1998) has referred to FN-curves and f-N curves as 
important concepts for the assessment of risks to populations from hazardous 
installations. The frequency of accidents causing exactly N fatalities is f(N). Hence, f-N 
curve is the plot of individual incident frequency f(N) versus its respective consequence 
exacting N. FN-curves are cumulative distribution curves which are plotted with the 
values of the cumulative frequencies, F versus N or more fatalities (HSE, 2003).  FN-
 16 
curves could be terminated at some maximum value, Nmax and the number of fatalities 
range from 1 to Nmax. Cumulative frequencies can be calculated using the following 
equation 2. 
      F(N) = f (N) + f (N+1) + f (N+2) + …                          (2)          
where,           f (N) = 0 for N > Nmax 
More often, the decisions made by management and regulators are highly 
subjective and risk-based rather than risk-informed. A clearer understanding of the 
tolerability criteria of companies in conjunction with the risk aversion of the society 
would also prove to be helpful in business decision making.  
Graphical presentation of information about the frequency of fatal accidents in a 
system and the distribution of the numbers of fatalities in such accidents is called 
Frequency-Number curve or simply FN-curves (Evans, 2003). The frequency F(N) of 
accidents with N or more fatalities is plotted in FN-curves. FN-graphs are usually drawn 
with logarithmic scales, as F and N sometimes range across several orders of magnitude. 
Evans (2003) indicates that the frequency of accidents with exactly N fatalities, 
f(N), from the F(N)‘s can be achieved from the FN-curves. Similarly, it is possible to get 
F(N)‘s from the f(N)‘s by summing the f(N)‘s upward from N. Thus, F(N)-curves can be 
formed from information on the f(N)‘s. We can write f(N) as follows (equation 3); 
f(N) = F(1)p(N)                                                     (3) 
 where, p(N) is the probability for an accident with exactly N fatalities. 
 One can use the p(N)‘s and ―calculate standard statistical quantities such as the 
mean and standard deviation of the number of fatalities per fatal accident‖. Hence, every 
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FN-curve can implicitly represents the ―overall accident frequency F(1), the probability 
distribution of fatalities in accidents p(N), the mean and standard deviation of number of 
fatalities per accident, and the mean number of fatalities per year‖ (Evans, 2003). 
Two general methods can be used for constructing FN-curves:  
(i) Calculating the FN-curve directly from empirical frequency data on past 
accidents and, 
(ii) Developing and using a probability model to estimate the frequencies 
Glickman (1996) provides modeling considerations in the analysis of risk 
management strategies and comments on societal risk by stating that it can be measured 
in two ways. Firstly, by way of FN-curves, which expresses the relationship between 
exceedance frequency and fatality. Secondly, by way of E(N), the expected number of 
fatalities in the concerned time period. The two measures are related as E(N) is the area 
under the FN-curve. FN gives the distribution of random variables N, while E[N] gives 
the expected value or mean distribution of N. 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) of UK and the Netherlands Organization 
for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), both heavily generate FN-curves, for assessing 
the probable societal group risks for licensing and land use planning in order to invoke 
suitable safety and emergency response measures (Health and Safety Executive, 1989; 
Carter, 1995; Natuurplanbureau, 2004).  The frequency exceedance curves provide the 
measure of the negative societal impact caused by the incidents (Carter & Hirst, 2000; 
Evans & Verlander, 1997; Health and Safety Executive, 1989, 1991, 1992, 2003; Health 
and Safety Executive, 2003; Hirst, 1998; Prem, Ng, Sawyer et al., 2010).  
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FN-curves are a ―means of presenting descriptive information about the fatal 
accident frequencies and fatality distributions‖ (Evans & Verlander, 1997; Evans, 2003; 
Carter & Hirst, 2000).  They are very similar to histograms and in fact represent the 
same information differently. With FN-curves we can invoke reasonable criteria by 
which to decide if the risks in the system are tolerable or not. The criteria are also known 
as ‗societal risk criteria‘. 
FN-curves are not used just as mere presentational devices but, also as a test for 
the tolerability of the risks. FN criterion lines have been used by various authors for 
about three decades and are an important concept or feature of the FN-curves. If the FN-
curve of a system completely lies below the lower criterion line, the system is regarded 
as tolerable. If some part of the FN-curve crosses the intolerable criterion line, then that 
system is considered intolerable. In case of intolerability, we have to take safety 
measures in order to lower the FN-curve by adopting suitable risk reduction measures. 
The region in between the intolerable and tolerable line is the ―as low as reasonably 
practicable‖ (ALARP) region which is the tolerable risk region. Clearly, the upper 
intolerable line is most important to be considered first for risk reduction purposes.  
The concept of criterion lines for FN-curves has been reviewed for the HSE by 
Ball and Floyd (1998) in the paper entitled Societal Risks. The HSE has cautiously 
recommended the proper use of the FN-curve criterion lines as mere guidelines for 
enhancing safety. In another publication Reducing risk, protecting people (HSE, 2001, 
paragraph 136) the HSE recommends an ―FN-criterion point, if not a line, for single 
major hazardous industrial sites‖. 
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 Since FN-curves represent the probability distribution of fatalities in accidents, 
judgments about the tolerability of FN-curves must be based on probability distributions. 
Lindley (1985) suggests that for achieving consistency in decision making using FN-
curves, the form of the criterion quantity to base decisions upon should also be 
―statistically expected value‖ of some function.  
Fig. 3, shows the different criterion lines initially used by the UK HSE based on 
railway incidents for channel tunnel safety in the UK (Eurotunnel, 1994). Two numbers 
are needed to specify the intolerable criterion line. They are the slope and the intercept. 
The slope of the line is related to the societal risk aversion to large accidents relative to 
small ones. Hence, a steeper line would indicate a greater societal risk aversion. The 
intercept of the line determines the total frequency of fatal accidents that is regarded as 
just tolerable for the portfolio being considered. The choice of both the slope and 
intercept of the criterion FN line depends on the type of portfolio being considered. In 
practice, the intercept is typically determined with reference to standards set by similar 
decisions elsewhere, eg. Canvey Lines were deduced from HSE‘s Canvey island report 
(Evans & Verlander, 1997).  
FN-curve shown in Fig. 3 has two criterion lines: (i) FN-curve upper limit 
Intolerable line. HSE used a standard of drawing a slope of negative one at 0.1 frequency 
previously which is shown in the figure. Any curve crossing this upper limit would 
indicate very high consequences and risks. (ii)Negligible line showed no threat of 
fatalities due to risk. The region between the two lines is the as-low-as-reasonably-
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practical (ALARP) region, where the threat to life can be significantly reduced by 
adopting risk mitigation strategies. 
 
 
Figure 3. FN-curves for railway incidents in UK for channel tunnel safety case 
with criterion lines (source: HSE, 1994) 
 
The criterion for decision making is different for different countries. The Dutch 
use more stringent criteria with a slope of -2. However, in cases where the companies 
which apply for licensing do not meet the set criteria, the decision making by regulators 
is based on qualitatively assessing the risks alongside the QRA performed and the 
emergency procedures in place for risk mitigation. There are no such criteria currently 
existing in the U.S. process industry. Understanding the risk tolerability of 
regulators/companies and risk aversion of the society could allow U.S. based processing 
companies to better manage their portfolio risks. 
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Fig. 4 adopted from Trobjevic provides the most recent criterion lines for risk 
intolerability based on QRA studies. THE UK-R2P2 has a criteria for intolerability 
published in the HSE document entitled ‗Reducing Risks Protecting People‘ (HSE, 
2001) set at 10-2 with a slope of -1. The old UK Land Use Planning (LUP) criteria 
matches the current Dutch criteria (old and new in Fig.4) set at 10-3 at a slope of -2. The 
new UK intolerable line adopted by UK-HSE based on its study of accident data for all 
facilities and for LUP is at 10-3 with a slope of -1.5. The Dutch criterion lines include 
only people working within the plant facility, whereas the UK-HSE criteria includes 
both people working inside and people residing outside the confines of the plant layout. 
The Czech and the French criteria are more relaxed in comparison to both the UK-HSE 
and the Dutch criterion line of intolerability for societal risks used for decision making. 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of FN-curves criterion lines (Source:  Trobjevic) 
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The criterion lines for intolerability for both societal risks and individual risks are 
provided in Table 1 along with their specific risk aversion factors. The risk aversion 
factors are used as guidelines for LUP and licensing and hence are not absolute estimates 
of acceptability of societal risks in itself. Hence, this information must be considered 
along with other risk metrics to understand the stakes at risk. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of FN-curve criterion line, individual risk and risk aversion 
factor (Adopted from Trobjevic, U.K.) 
Criterion 
FN-
Criterion 
Line 
Aversion 
Factor 
Individual 
Risk 
UK 
(R2P2) 1.00E-02 1 1.00E-05 
UK-Old 1.00E-03 2 1.00E-05 
UK-New 1.00E-03 1.5 3.00E-06 
Dutch-Old 1.00E-03 2 1.00E-05 
Dutch-
New 1.00E-03 2 1.00E-06 
 
 
FN-curves are valuable tools that outline certain tolerability of risks as 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. The criterion for tolerability is based on the perception of 
risk and the 'expected utility function'. Since, FN-curves represent a negative concept of 
potential fatalities resulting from incidents; the criterion of ‗expected utility function‘ is 
also preferentially called the ‗expected disutility function‘, D.  The classical decision 
theory renders itself towards consistent decision making for tolerability for FN-curves 
(Lindley, 1985). 
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The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) of UK has guidelines for land-use 
planning around hazardous installations (Health and Safety Executive, 1989) and has 
developed the concept of ‗Risk Integral‘ as an important technical development (Carter 
and Hirst, 2000).  The term ―Risk Integral‖ is an expected disutility function for multiple 
fatality accidents. Several factors can be estimated from FN-curves which are briefly 
stated below. 
FN-curves also have weighted risk indicator' factors applied to depict the nature 
of societal aversion by placing a greater emphasis on multiple fatalities. The weighted 
risk indicator factor is also called the ‗aversion multiplier‘. Greater the aversion 
multiplier implies that greater will be the number of expected fatalities. HSE provides 
the following relationship shown in equation 4 to account for societal aversion (Hirst, 
1998).  
                       
      
            
    (4)           
where,                N = number of fatalities 
      F(N) = frequency of occurrence of N 
           a = slope of FN-curve criterion lines  
Different societal risk aversion factors result from the value of a, the slope of 
FN-curve which defines the various criterion lines for the curve. Schofield (1993), 
suggests the use of aversion multipliers N0.5 and N to provide alternate ENFY risk 
aversion factors as shown below, 
f(N)   N1. 5 and f(N)   N2              
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Okrent et al., (1981) suggests the expected number of fatalities from FN-curves has the 
societal risk aversion factor of 1.2 (Hirst, 1998).  
f(N)   N1. 2                                                           
Evans and Verlander (1997) provide the insight into judging FN-curves to assess 
the tolerability of so-called societal risk. The authors state that the current practical 
approach is based on the position of the FN-curves representing the risks from hazardous 
systems in relation to criterion lines. After estimating risks the authors suggest that 
judgments of decision makers must be based on societal risks. The authors call this 
process as risk appraisal or risk evaluation. Decisions cannot be made based solely on 
FN-curves and criterion lines. Hence, in addition to FN-curves, quantified risk values are 
also needed for decision making. For the life cycle of a plant, the decisions are 
essentially made based on some form of cost-benefit analysis would translate to net cash 
flow or net present value. Therefore, while risk curves are important risk information for 
determining leading indicators for incidents, the risk values must be represented in 
monetary terms.  
  Stallen, Geerts and Vrijling (1996) in their paper ‗three conceptions of quantified 
societal risk‘ indicate that fatality is the only indicating factor of adverse consequence in 
risk management. The authors mention that time and space is ignored in assessing 
societal risk (SR) but is an important aspect which needs to be included in the SR 
estimation. With their inclusion SR will favor risk averse rather than a risk prone 
behavior.  The SR assessments should imply judgments about the distribution of safety 
and other costs. The authors conclude that in order to make safety investments for the 
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sake of lowering SR, a systematic and conditional representation of the SR is very 
essential.  
Merz and Bohnenblust (1993) apply the methodology of marginal cost criterion 
and support the cost-effectiveness cost approach to reduce SR. They advocate that the 
SR should be decreased to the point of the least marginal cost. SR is defined as the 
―weighted sum of the probability p times consequence C‖ for different negative 
consequences as shown in equation 5.  
SR = (pNi)* CNi*QNi             (5) 
where, QNi is the risk aversion factor for the consequence Ni. 
Jorissen (2004) in his work, ‗flood protection, safety standards and societal risk‘, 
judges SR at a national level based on flood statistics for Netherlands using FN-curves. 
The number of fatalities on a national level scale can be described as a probability 
density function (pdf). The pdf can be derived from available data or models. From the 
pdf a characteristic risk is obtained which is the SR. SR can be expressed as the ―number 
of fatalities which during a year will not be exceeded with a certain probability‖ and is 
shown in equation 6. 
  SR = E(Ndi) + k. (Ndi)     (6) 
where,        E(Ndi) is the expectation of the number of fatalities for activity i 
        (Ndi) is the standard deviation of the number of fatalities for activity i 
 k is the risk aversion factor for large accidents which can be calibrated to    
affect the   probability of exceedance. 
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2.1.3. F$-curves  
Besides estimating the harm to people, monetizing the damages will also be 
important for decision making to judge business prospects. Therefore, the effects of 
resulting potential monetary losses should also be graphically represented. This can be 
realized by constructing curves of cumulative frequency vs. monetary damage which is 
designated as F$-curves and are generated similar to FN-curve. Subsequently, 
performing this calculation will provide the cumulative frequencies for the entire set of 
scenarios which can be graphed against the accrued monetary loss. In addition to these 
risk curves, the risk values themselves should be monetized. For this purpose, the 
concepts of Value-at-Risk are utilized for tangible asset monetization in this work. 
2.2. Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
Value-at-Risk is a type of risk metrics to predict the market value of a portfolio. 
This concept is widely used by banks, security firms, energy merchants and other trading 
organizations. It is the ―maximum amount of risk to be lost from any investment‖. 
Historic volatility and risk metrics are utilized by these organizations to track portfolio 
market risks. However, as VaR is a general concept, it can be implemented to assess the 
risks in the various chemical processes to predict future losses in monetary terms (Fang 
et al., 2004; Prem, Ng, Sawyer et al., 2010). 
Value-at-Risk is based on probability distribution for a portfolio‘s market value. 
Probability distribution helps characterize assets that have uncertain market values. 
Generally, some kind of weighting index is utilized in the financial industry. In the 
financial industry, VaR is extensively utilized to measure financial risks in the financial 
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markets (Benning & Wiener, 1998). Markowitz first mathematically defined the concept 
of ―risk‖ in financial industry as the variance on return of investment that should be 
minimized in order to maximize the portfolio return (Kondapaneni, 2005).  
VaR can be defined as the expected portfolio loss at some confidence level -
usually 5% loss or 95% gain (Butler, 1999; Jorion, 2007).  In other words, VaR gives the 
difference between the profit value and its mean at a confidence level and a time horizon 
(Duffie & Pan, 1997). VaR measure provides the maximum expected loss due to an 
undesired event which helps represent the monetary risk to investors and management. 
Fig. 5 schematizes the maximum expected portfolio loss with confidence limit of 5% 
(outliers) for VaR measure. Hence, VaR is most suitable for extreme value risk analysis 
loss estimations. For estimating the VaR measure, the basic theme is to map the portfolio 
risks (R) to the probability of expected losses (P) by way of some mapping function (
 
 
Figure 5. Maximum expected portfolio loss with confidence level for VaR measure 
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In VaR, the returns will determine the value of the portfolio over time. If the 
value comes below a certain target threshold above the original investment value, it is 
considered a loss. VaR can be defined as the expected portfolio loss at some confidence 
level (Jorion, 2007) over a certain time horizon. The VaR for 99% confidence of loss  
(1% chance of loss to the company) is given by the following equation 7.  
                                                        (7)       
                                          
                                                                                             
                                      
VaR is based on the concept of expected value in traditional statistics. If the 
investment on asset n is some value hi and the return on this investment is the random 
variable Ri, then the weighted average of each expected return E [Ri] is the total expected 
return on the portfolio, Rp as shown in equation 8 (Kondapaneni, 2005).  
                                                                                                 (8)                      
Christopherson and Diebold (2000) & Berkowitz (2001) argue in order for VaR 
measure to be a coherent risk measure one should account for the kurtosis and fat-tails in 
the probability distribution function (pdf) and not just VaR as a single number itself. In 
that sense, the expected shortfall also known as C-VaR is defined as in equation 9. 
                                                              (9) 
Markowitz (1957) provided the original approaches for portfolio risk is mean-
variance analysis as shown in equation 10. If we have three assets with returns rx, ry and 
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rz and we give them weights wx, wy and wz such that the sum of weights is 1. The 
portfolio mean return is 
                                   (10) 
Bradley and Taqqu (2002) assume that the expected return is zero, then the VaR  
volatility equation for portfolio is as shown in equation 11. 
              
                   (11) 
The portfolio volatility equation with Markowitz equation gives the portfolio 
VaR for specified consequence as shown in equation 12. 
             
        
                                                             (12) 
Kondapaneni (2005) explains VaR using the Delta–normal method assuming the 
portfolio is normally distributed for agricultural economic setting. Therefore, the returns 
are estimated to be normally distributed for application in agricultural studies. If the 
portfolio current value is p and the various risks which represent the present asset value 
is the vector R then Kondapaneni suggests that there needs to be a method to transform 
the R to some P. In his work the transformation has standard normal distribution. 
Therefore, theta is the mapping function that transforms the R into P as shown in 
equation 13. VaR for such a portfolio using the delta-normal method requires the 
evaluation of the mean and standard deviation for the P. 
P =  (R)               (13) 
The advantage of utilizing VaR in chemical industry is its ability to provide at a 
certain confidence level, the worst possible expected loss for potential deviating 
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scenarios of a ‗portfolio‘ of risks (representing an installation, a plant or a site). If the 
maximum loss due to potential accidents is determined for a portfolio then, we can 
maximize the portfolio return and also improve plant safety.  The returns will determine 
the value of the portfolio over time. If the value comes below a certain target threshold 
above the original investment value it is considered a loss.  
The advantage of utilizing VaR in chemical industry is its ability to provide at a 
certain confidence level, the worst possible expected loss for a large pool of potential 
deviating scenarios of a ‗portfolio‘ of risks (representing an installation, a plant or a 
site). Based on the VaR value, management can make risk reduction decisions or choose 
between competing portfolio options. 
The widespread adoption of VaR in the financial industry has been accompanied 
by criticism of VaR as a measure of risk. Summarizing a distribution in a single 
probability number at a loss threshold without due regard to what extent losses above the 
threshold can accumulate (the pdf goes asymptotically to infinite loss) is a weakness of 
VaR. In the chemical industry the value of the assets are not subject to such 
uncertainties.  
Getting a model is more important step and VaR metric simply results based on 
that characterization. In other words, any VaR measure can support any VaR metric and 
VaR measure can be discussed disregarding a specific VaR metric it supports.  In 
financial industry, some function is the mapping function which maps the entire vector 
space or n-dimension of risk key factors to a 1-D space of the portfolio market value. 
i.e., given an R, we can get P.  
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So generally speaking there are two pieces to the puzzle to obtain VaR 
measurement. 
(i) First is the key factor R identification. The R are observable factors such as 
financial variability, historical data etc, which will enable us to judge the type of 
joint distribution to use. We can then convert R to P. 
(ii) The second puzzle piece is the mapping function that relates the P and R. 
Overtime, this formula can even change to reflect any changes made to the 
portfolio. 
Both the puzzle pieces however, cannot by themselves give the information of 
how risky the portfolio is. Only combining the two pieces will give us an estimate of the 
worst possible loss. Fig.6 schematizes the transformation of portfolio risk to probability 
of potential incidents using mapping function, . 
 
 
Figure 6. Schematic showing transformation of risk to probability of potential incidents 
using mapping function,  
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Risk is defined as the combination of the probability or frequency of occurrence 
of an event along with its magnitude of damage or consequence. For VaR purposes we 
will define the probability/frequency as the uncertainty and the magnitude of 
damage/consequence as the exposure as shown in equation 14.  
VaR = exposure x uncertainty             (14) 
Advantages of using VaR, 
(i) Measure of worst loss of portfolio over time horizon at some confidence level 
(ii) Bridge the gap engineers and scientists who calculate process risk and, the 
business leaders and policy makers who evaluate, manage, or regulate risk in a 
broader context (Fang et al, 2004) 
(iii) Gives total cost-benefit analysis of entire portfolio via single probability 
distribution function (pdf) value  
(iv) VaR for different time horizon calculations is possible  
(v) Includes sensitivity analysis for reliable risk estimation 
(vi) Gives a thorough risk and investment management analysis 
The concept of risk analysis using QRA and VaR is fairly new. The method 
adopted by Fang et.al, is promising yet has several drawbacks: 1) Fang does not perform 
a CPQRA for an entire portfolio before VaR is calculated. Consideration of the CPQRA 
for a complete portfolio is essential for VaR because it gives the absolute expected 
damage for all scenarios. 2) VaR is calculated monetarily only in terms of the 
consequences for tangible assets. VaR should include both the frequency of occurrence 
and the consequences of accidents to avoid risk under-representation, 3) although 
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extremely important, societal risk estimations are not considered. 4) the point estimates 
of VaR are considered as opposed to the entire distribution. Considering scenario risk 
distributions would help overcome uncertainties in VaR prediction.  
 Bagajewicz and Aseeri (2004) also utilize VaR concepts but, do so only to 
minimize the cost factor in solving problems of chemical plant design and optimization 
at its inception stage. For example, optimum profits in refineries are calculated using 
VaR by estimating crude oil market price fluctuations. Energy traders on financial 
exchanges also use VaR in this fashion for hedging risks. 
For business decision purposes, the expression of losses in monetary units 
becomes important. Schupp et al., (2002) show the importance of economic analysis for 
a layers of protection analysis study. The risks estimated probabilistically in monetary 
units will provide the value of the risks as benefits or losses. VaR and QRA as a 
combined tool was first stated as the bridge between engineers who quantify the risks 
and the management who make business decisions based on the estimated risks by Fang, 
Ford and Mannan ( 2004). However, the approach of Fang et. al., is limited in scope 
because their study is not inclusive of the societal risk. Further their study does not 
consider the VaR value in combination with QRA. VaR is only calculated on the basis of 
consequences hence it does not provide the losses based on risk analysis. The study does 
not provide all the information for decision making. We address these issues in this 
paper by combining QRA with VaR so as to obtain losses based on fully quantified risk 
analysis. 
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The advantage of using VaR is its generality but, this also poses a challenge. The 
challenging task in this research is to find a way to determine the suitable probability 
distribution of a portfolio‘s market value by way of mapping it to QRA. Needless to say 
that if there are complexities involved in a portfolio assessment, then it is exposed to a 
greater source of market risk. However, in this work, QRA based VaR has risk 
consequences calculated from scientific models for most accurate loss of containment, 
fire and explosion scenarios. Therefore, relying on QRA as a precursor to VaR 
estimation will eliminate much of the uncertainty in estimated potential incident losses. 
Once VaR measure is obtained the lagging indicator information will be complete. 
Historical information should also be used to understand the trends of chemical process 
industry incidents in order to help prevent future incidents and catastrophes. 
2.3. Incident Database Analysis 
It is said that history repeats itself. However, in the chemical process industry, 
history repeating itself would be more damaging to the industry not only in terms of the 
financial losses but also in terms of the major regulatory restrictions, societal losses, and 
irreversible environmental damage (Khan & Abbasi, 1999). The Bhopal disaster (1984) 
is a classic example of the negative impact of a chemical incident (Bowonder, 1987). 
This single incident has brought about substantial regulatory changes throughout the US 
and worldwide (Willey et al., 2006). While no other incident can come close to the 
devastation racked by the Bhopal incident, there are other catastrophes which were 
major disasters such as the Texas City Incident (1947) (Blocker & Blocker, 1949), the 
Flixborough incident (1974) (Venart, 2004), the Phillips explosion (1989) (Lepkowski, 
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1989) and more recently the BP Texas City incident (2005) (Hopkins, 2010; Khan & 
Amyotte, 2007). Due to the nature of such incidents being rare events, there is only a 
limited amount of historical data available to understand them. Rare events generally 
have higher probability for causing damage on a catastrophic level. Therefore, 
retrospective consequence information harnessed from reported accident databases 
would lend itself valuable for monitoring process safety performance, for accident 
investigation and, also for applying suitable hazard analysis techniques and safety 
measures to prevent similar incident occurrences (Martilleni & Waddell, 2007). 
Database analysis would provide the required safety feedback or lagging indicator 
information for monitoring key performances in chemical manufacturing and petroleum 
refining facilities (Doval & Kovacs, 2009).  
Accident databases typically require the reporting of accident details such as the 
type of chemicals released along with the quantity released, the cause of incident, the 
number of people fatally injured, the number of people hospitalized with serious injuries, 
the number of people sustaining minor injuries and the number of evacuation and/or 
shelter in place. The information can be used to summarize the types of incidents, the 
different initiation or causes for incidents, common chemical releases and the severity of 
their consequences. However, little effort has been made to harness the information 
contained in the databases to understand the frequency of the number of persons 
negatively affected, the accident consequence trends and the relationships between the 
consequences of industry incidents. Carter and Menckel (1990) stress the importance of 
accident investigation utilizing historical accident information in order to learn as much 
 36 
as possible from each accident to prevent future incidents. Harnessing the accident 
databases, which have a wealth of information, help in better understanding the large 
number of incidents, their consequence losses and causes for the incidents. Such incident 
and loss causation models provide statistically significant information depicting the 
industry incident profiles, which could greatly improve the safety systems and risk 
mitigation measures adopted to prevent future incidents (Bird & Germain, 1992; 
Storbakken, 2002). Database analyses results could also guide in making more efficient 
regulatory policies (Ferry, 1988).  
One of the effective methods for studying the effects of incidents is the 
incorporation of societal losses (Stallen, Geerts & Vrijling, 1996). For the sake of 
understanding the societal losses from historical incidents, the relationship between 
exceedance frequencies and consequences such as fatalities and injuries can be 
generated. The relationships are representations of the societal consequences and the 
distribution of the number of fatalities and injuries for reported incidents. In general, 
exceedance curves are used to represent catastrophic losses that give the probability (or 
frequency if year is taken into account) of occurrence of some random variable 
(fatalities, $, injuries) such that it does exceed some fixed $, fatality or injury number. 
They are cumulative distribution curves as they describe the probability (frequency) of 
occurrence of random variables. 
While exceedance curves focus on high impact (high risk) consequences such as 
fatalities and injuries, there is a need to understand the low risk consequences such as 
near-misses to prevent the escalation of losses leading to high consequences such as 
 37 
injuries and deaths. Heinrich (1932) in his domino theory mentions that in order to 
identify the steps that lead to high risk consequences, the knowledge of low 
consequences is essential. Based on the domino theory, Heinrich also proposed his 
safety pyramid (Heinrich, 1940). He stated that high consequences could be eliminated 
or limited by working on preventing and reducing the lower accident consequences. He 
studied over 1 million facilities and recorded the accident consequence ratio of 1:29:300 
for major injuries, minor injuries, and no-injury incidents. According to his study, 
generally large number of high-probability incidents with low consequences would 
eventually have the potential to result in few low-probability events or catastrophes with 
high consequences (Heinrich et al., 1980). Hence, generating similar safety pyramids 
from current accident databases would enable the understanding of the incident 
consequence ratios and their trends in the process industry. 
Similar to the safety pyramid developed by Heinrich, Bird (1969), Tye and 
Pearson (1975), have also developed similar safety pyramids (Heinrich et al., 1980; 
Okabe & Ohtani, 2009).  Foraher (1993) generated the safety pyramid to include all 
injuries to the personnel of a company along with contractors (Lievre & Foraher, 1995). 
The equipment damages were related to serious incidents only and the unsafe acts had 
no realistic figures available. Lievre & Foraher (1995) provide safety pyramids as part of 
a system for the early detection of safety management failures. The data on the worst 
safety performances for six oil rigs were analyzed and safety pyramid was generated. 
The proposed safety pyramid helped undertake proper safety measures which are 
reported to have improved safety performance of drilling rigs around the world and 
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decreased the lost time accident frequency of the company by half. The Heinrich 
Pyramid (Heinrich et al., 1980) also shows that a progressive increase of near-misses and 
minor incidents would eventually lead to a major accident. Referring to the Heinrich 
Pyramid, Mannan et al., (2005) indicate that the underlying causal factors for any 
incident are generally the same irrespective of which tier of the pyramid the incident 
would fall under. In general, safety pyramid has been conducted internally in some 
individual companies such as Conoco Phillips (2003) to understand the suitable safety 
initiatives (Masimore, 2007). However, this benefit does not promote information 
sharing across the process industry in order to improve safety and decrease the frequency 
of the number of incidents.  
As process incidents are low‐probability events, management should track the 
―near-misses‖ or ―low-consequence‖ events such as evacuations and shelter-in-place, to 
study the accident propensity in order to prevent serious accident consequences 
(Heinrich, 1932; Rosenthal, 2008). Lakin (2009) suggests that the base of the pyramid 
and bottom up approach for accident investigation is much needed to better understand 
the top of the pyramid and the significant incident risks. Hence, limiting incident 
propensities and prevention of serious incident consequences can be possible by 
understanding the relationship between the different consequences of incidents. 
Generally, incident information in the lower tiers of the pyramid are available more than 
the top tier of the pyramid. Therefore, statistical methods to assess the relationship 
between the different levels of the safety pyramid will be useful in understanding the 
proximity to an injury or fatality. For example, if the data monitored by a company 
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indicates a certain number of shelter in-place and evacuation, the statistical correlation 
could be utilized to estimate the proximity of the process operation which could result in 
injuries and fatalities. Mannan et al., suggest that it is only a matter of chance that low 
severity consequences result from incidents which could otherwise, under suitable 
conditions, easily have resulted in more serious consequences (Mannan et al., 2005).  
The current work utilizes the Risk Management Program (RMP) (EPA, 2009) and the 
Hazardous Substance Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) databases to analyze the 
incidents and their consequences. Based on the data of RMP for the years 1994 to 2009, 
collected in three separate tranches of 5-year reporting in 1999, 2003 and 2009, and the 
information contained in the HSEES database from 1996 to 2004, the exceedance 
frequencies for societal losses, the safety pyramids and the regression analyses were 
generated to understand the trends and factors influencing chemical process industry 
incidents. The objective of this work is to provide lagging indicator information by 
analyzing information collected in the databases for understanding the eminent societal 
risks (losses), to layout the different consequences using safety pyramids and to provide 
the statistical relationships between different consequences to effectively understand the 
industry trends for improving process safety.  
2.4. Decision Analysis 
 Once the risks are quantified, the decision makers are faced with the challenge 
of choosing the optimum risk reduction measures. Risk mitigation strategies are always 
achieved with a cost and most often than not, the decision is to be made between 
conflicting factors of safety and production. Eliminating risk completely is possible only 
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with a very high cost because it is governed by the law of diminishing returns. Further, 
risk reduction measures applied at one area of a portfolio should also ensure that the 
risks are not transferred elsewhere. Cost benefit analysis (CBA) must be performed to 
assess the benefits to the cost of reducing risks or the cost of choosing one portfolio 
option over another.   
Any chemical plant operation is robust only when a strategic balance is struck 
between optimal plant operations, CBA for installing new risk reduction measures or 
processes and, maintaining health, safety and environment. The balance emerges from 
choosing the best option amidst several conflicting parameters of operations vs. safety. 
Most often the lack of fully understanding the operational risks lead to subjective 
decision making in the hope of improving safety. Hence, strategies for normative 
decision making are needed for making choices under uncertainty. Decision theory and 
concepts of expected utility theory can be effectively utilized for enabling a rational 
decision maker to choose the most preferred risk. Here, additionally a framework for 
choosing the most preferred option to trade-off between the conflict of production and 
safety is conceptualized as a game for strategic interdependent decision making.  
Making intelligent decisions towards safety is especially difficult because of the 
complex processes, instrumentation for functional safety and choosing safer alternatives 
for preventing incidents. Almost always a series of process events occur in a sequence 
to cause scenarios with major losses. Decision makers have the tremendous burden of 
accounting for all the probable issues amidst inherent uncertainties and make judgment 
calls which are most accurate and least subjective. Additionally, decision makers most 
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often work with multiple objectives (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). Adding another 
dimension to the case of the decision maker‘s plight is the fact that different 
conclusions invariably could result from different perspectives (Clemen & Reilly, 
2001). All these factors render decision making as an arduous task which must be 
assiduously solved with a set of workable techniques. 
 Establishing a workable framework utilizing the already existing techniques can 
provide better decisions for complex problems with the goal of achieving multiple 
objectives. In process industry, generally the objectives are to increase production, 
selectively increase yield, reduce cost of production, increase profit, protect plant assets 
and personnel safety. Studies in process safety have shown that increasing process safety 
directly impacts other avenues of operations in helping to achieve the desired objectives 
stated in Section 1.2 (Fig. 1). Decision analysis acknowledges that a decision maker‘s 
decision is not perfect but, at the very least can help layout the plan of the actual 
problems and thus enable better decision making (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). Decision 
maker is assumed to be a rational thinker who utilizes the structure and guidance 
provided by the decision theory to recommend alternatives that must be intelligently 
selected (Clemen &Reilly, 2001, VonNeumann & Morgenstern, 1947).  
Owing to the attributes of complexity, uncertainty, multiple objectives and 
problems of different competing perspectives leading to different conclusions, decision 
theory serves as an excellent guide for making trade-offs to arrive at a preferred course 
of action. The preferred course of action is the direct indication of the choice made to 
adopt the least risky alternative or the most preferred risk alternative among several 
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competing risk alternatives. The concept of ―most preferred‖ or ―best‖ options are based 
on preferences or values which are synonymous in decision analysis (Meszaros & 
Rapcsak, 1996).  
Zhou, Ang and Po (2004) classify the different kinds of decision analysis 
methods as single objective decision making methods (SODM), multiple criteria 
decision making methods (MCDM) and decision support systems (DSS). SODM is a 
class of methods for evaluating all the single objective situation alternatives with 
uncertainties. A common SODM method are the decision tree (DT) and the influence 
diagram (ID). These two SODMs provide concise representation of the decision 
problems (Janssen, 2001). MCDM is multiple criteria based approach allowing decision 
makers to choose alternatives based on some system of ranking by evaluation of several 
defined criteria (Brans & Vincke, 1985; Brans, Vincke & Mareschal, 1986). Decisions 
are based on trade-offs or compromises among many different conflicting criteria 
(Colson & Bruyn, 1989; Zeleny, 1982). MCDM can be further classified as multiple 
objective decision making (MODM) and multiple attribute decision making (MADM) 
(Yoon & Hwang, 1995). MODM methods are multiple objective mathematical 
programming models with defined constraints where optimized or ―best‖ choices among 
conflicting objectives are chosen (Hwang & Masud, 1979). Multiple attribute decision 
theory is based on preference decisions made by prioritizing the alternatives after the 
evaluation of multiple conflicting attributes. Multiple attribute utility theory (MAUT) or 
expected utility theory (EUT) allows referencing of multiple attribute utility functions 
(Fishburn, 1970; Roy and Vincke, 1981; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976).  
 43 
Special cases of MAUT are multiple attribute value theory (MAVT) and 
expected monetary value theory or expected monetary value (EMVT or EMV). MAVT 
entails values placed on the consequences of the alternatives and EMVT entails only 
decisions made based on comparisons of monetary values of assets. Another well known 
decision making method is the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) consisting of 
structuring, measurement and synthesis, to aid in better decision making (Saaty, 1980; 
Saaty, 1990). Meszaros and Rapcsak (1996) introduce a DSS group to support solution 
of wide class of decision problems. This requires the sensitivity analyses of decision 
parameters with weights in utility function. Zhou, Ang and Poh (2006) list recent 
publications on decision analyses for energy and environmental modeling. The authors 
list multi attribute utility theory, decision support systems and single objective decision 
making. Pohekar and Ramachandran (2004) show the application of multi criteria 
decision making for sustainable energy. Chen, Kilgour and Hipel (2008) provide 
importance of multiple criteria decision analysis for decision makers and provide 
methods for screening in the presence of multiple criteria.  
Expected utility theory is adopted here because of its versatility to enable the 
study of other factors such as risk acceptability and societal risk aversion to certain 
processes which cannot be directly measured but can be preferenced and ranked to arrive 
at the ―most preferred‖ risk trade-off, in addition to estimating the expected monetary 
value losses because of risks and the trade-off between implementing risk reduction 
safety systems. Blaise Pascal and Daniel Bernoulli were the first to provide the basics of 
EUT as early as the eighteenth century (Duarte, 1999). After this, it was not until the 
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twenty first century when Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) laid down the axioms 
of EUT that the modern multi attribute utility theory studies came into focus as an 
important field of study.  
The normative axioms of expected utility theory as put forth by non Neumann 
and Morgenstern are as stated: 
(i) Preference order axiom – the decision maker is able to compare and rank 
alternative pairs as preferred to or indifferent to which enables the ranking of 
alternatives 
(ii) Continuity axiom – in case of several alternatives, say x, y and r, r is 
preferred to x and x is preferred to y, then there exists some real 
rx ~ x 
(iii)Independence preference axiom – If there are three different alternatives x, y 
and r, then x>y will provide a combination of xr as the preferred 
option 
Game theory is a powerful concept which attempts to mathematically elicit the 
strategic behavioral strategies where the choices made for success is dependent on the 
other available choices (Dixit & Skeath, 2004; Osborne, 2004). Emile` Borel first 
developed the concepts of game theory in 1938 (May, 1970). Game theory was first used 
to study the competitions between one individual compared to others loss, a concept 
called zero sum game.  In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern developed 
the concepts of game theory further and paved the way for modern game theory to be 
studied by many other scholars who studied the theory to be applied to many different 
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fields (vonNeumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Concepts from this theory has now 
successfully been studied and applied in the field of economics, political science, 
evolutionary biology (Smith, 1982), social sciences, philosophy, security (Cox, 2009), 
international relations, international security, computer science, flood prediction and 
earthquake predictions and transportation route models (Roumboutsos & Kapros, 2008). 
The designing of game theory strategies for decision making is deemed as being more 
advantageous in terms of being more accurate and enabling better prediction of loss or 
gain (Aumann & Shapley, 1974; Wright, 2002).  
    An application of game theory approach is shown by Roumboutsos and Kapros 
(2008) for optimizing the cost for urban public transportation. Nash equilibrium method 
is used to identify the outcomes of the markets and is compared to case studies. The 
model is said to be good guide to help public transportation policy decision makers to 
identify the most cost-effective solutions concerning transportation. Wright (2002) 
utilizes game theory concepts and suggests that individuals who are enmeshed in role-
playing situations of conflict will benefit from their level of experience and prior 
learning in forecasting accurate outcomes of uncertain future. Angelou and Economides 
(2008) utilize game theory to achieve solutions for a multi-criteria broadband technology 
business model for an irreversible information and communications technology industry 
problem. Information and communications technology business is stated as the most 
expensive sector in the information technology industry, one which traditional cost 
benefit analysis cannot handle because of its complexity. The authors attempt the 
modeling based on competitive player interactions. The authors utilize a method which 
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is a combination of analytic hierarchy process, real options and game theory principles 
to achieve an optimal solution. 
Regardless of which field the concepts of this theory is being applied to, the 
common theme remains that it is essentially a study of strategic interactions for 
understanding the relationships between conflicts because of competition and 
cooperation and, is generally the study of wide array of strategic interactions, all 
essential for more confident and independent decision making. The different classes of 
interactions can be classified in to different criteria. The aim of this theory is to then 
arrive at an equilibrium or ‗Pareto optimal‘ solution (Chen, Kilgour & Hipel, 2008). 
Named after Vilfred Pareto, Pareto optimality is a measure of efficiency of the outcome 
of a game, where there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well off. 
Pareto optimal solutions are hence different from Nash equilibrium solutions. Many 
different strategies exist for achieving equilibrium solution of which the well known and 
widely utilized method was given by John Nash (1950) called Nash equilibrium.  
CCPS book on guidelines for process safety metrics (AIChE/CCPS, 2009) 
provides instructions and examples for effective process safety management utilizing 
both leading and lagging metrics. Importance is stressed on factors such as the 
effectiveness of tracking and understanding performance indicators, collecting, 
evaluating and communicating process safety metrics as a guide to the company 
corporate management and site levels. The authors also encourage the ―adoption of a set 
of consensus process safety metrics‖. However, there are no guidelines or framework on 
how to include both leading and lagging metrics together, especially one which is 
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scientific risk analysis based. Hence, this work focuses on laying the ground works for 
developing risk measures constituting risk metrics for process safety, which is described 
in the following Section 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The approach to solving the four-fold problems defined in Section 2 is to first 
predict all portfolio scenarios and risks which will help understand the different types of 
incident scenarios. Once risks are quantified using the source and consequence models, 
the next step is to monetize the portfolio risks by the inclusion of business interruptions 
based on the loss of turnover of tangible assets, estimating the maximum possible 
financial loss for each scenario. The estimated expected loss is then to be graphically 
represented to pictorially show all the losses. The last objective is the decision making 
process to understand the benefits vs. cost for different scenarios to enable better-risk 
informed decisions. Fig. 7 schematizes the different research objectives. 
 
 
Figure 7. Schematic showing research objectives 
 49 
Probabilistic methods are more cost-effective methods to analyze portfolio risks 
as they give results that are easier to communicate to decision makers. Therefore the 
proposed methodology will utilize the different concepts of probability theory to 
estimate the portfolio risks. The focus of this work is developing leading and lagging 
indicators by way of monetizing the asset loss and including societal consequences for 
potential accidents to make better business decisions. The proposed methodology utilizes 
the different concepts of probability theory to estimate the portfolio risks. Here a 
catastrophe is defined as the undesired event which results in one or more fatalities.  
The proposed methodology for making the business case for process safety is as 
shown in Fig. 8 and includes the following steps:  
(i)  Risk estimation of a portfolio by Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)  
(ii) The monetization of the tangible risks with the inclusion of the lost time of 
production  
(ii) The estimation of the maximum portfolio loss using Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
approach (iv) The inclusion of intangible risks using tools such as FN-curves,  
(v)  Estimation of lagging metrics utilizing database analysis for estimating US 
chemical incident trends and,  
(vi) The framework for choosing the most preferred option with decisions 
analysis concepts of expected utility theory (EUT) and game theory (GT)  
The risks estimated in monetary terms can be expressed in a number of measures 
such as Value-at-Risk (VaR), Expected Annual Loss (EAL) and Scenario Risk Spectrum 
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(SRS) with risk curves such as FN-curves and F$-curves, all together enabling better 
judgment and decision making.  
 
 
Figure 8. Research methodology for making business case in process industry 
 
First step is the QRA study and characterization of the portfolio risks. Performing 
the process hazard analysis will provide information on all the potential deviating 
scenarios. The calculation of the event probabilities and the consequence estimation for 
each of the scenarios will provide the quantified results of QRA for all scenarios of a 
portfolio.  The total portfolio risks are then classified as tangible risks and intangible 
risks (i.e., societal risk). In our study, only societal risk pertaining to loss of life is 
considered to serve the purpose of studying extreme events. The tangible risks pertain to 
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all process equipment repairs, lost production, business interruption, claims, 
environmental clean-up and other measurable asset value within the portfolio. If the 
portfolio risks leading to the potential damages are estimated early, then they would aid 
in better understanding the severity of the risks and enable risk-informed decision 
making in order to adopt proper risk reduction measures. Risk analysis of a plant 
provides the possible scenarios leading to hazardous material releases and in extreme 
cases fires and explosion, with many different consequences and frequencies. The 
probability density function of losses is found by summing all scenario frequencies and 
taking each scenario probability as the fraction of the total frequency. Interruption of the 
process operation has to be expressed in loss of turnover in view of fixed and variable 
costs and in a serious case in loss of market (Mannan, 2005). Once the portfolios risks 
are quantified and monetized, the next step in the methodology is the estimation of the 
possible Value-at-Risk.  
VaR is calculated after all the assets of the plant are monetized.  Damage to 
equipment, structures etc. can be expressed in repair and replacement costs. For the 
purpose of our study only tangible assets involved in the chemical processing within the 
plant are considered.  Interruptions of the process operations are expressed in terms of 
the loss of turnover in view of fixed and variable costs of all assets of the chosen 
portfolio (Mannan, 2005).  
In this study, the portfolio model chosen for the application of our methodology 
is schematized in Fig. 9. If we consider any chemical plant, it is generally surrounded 
either by several adjacent chemical plants or residential areas.  If we assume that our 
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plant includes residential areas (out-of-plant area) in its vicinity, then the consideration 
of the societal impact from potential accidents becomes inevitable.  
 
 
Figure 9. Portfolio model showing chemical plant surrounded by residential  
area in its vicinity 
 
In the event of potential accidents, the loss of societal property such as buildings, 
hospitals, schools, also add to the total value lost outside the plant. The sum of the costs 
incurred due to potential loss of these assets would be the total societal cost as a measure 
of the societal risk. In this research, it is assumed that the risk of the possible loss of life 
far outweighs the risk of the loss of infrastructure in the residential areas for the purpose 
of decision making and hence those values are excluded.  
Other than the portfolio model shown in Fig. 9, which is studied in this work, 
there could be another portfolio model shown in Fig. 10, which could also be used in the 
proposed methodology. Generally, a chemical plant is surrounded by many other 
chemical plants along its boundaries. In such cases, the entire portfolio could be 
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considered as one large chemical plant. For the consideration of the out-of-plant area 
distance, to be included for QRA of the portfolio, it is noted that most high-impact 
incidents result in fatalities within a mile of the plant area (Kaszniak, Holmstrom and 
MacKenzie, 2007). Hence, an area of 1 mile radius from the portfolio of interest is 
considered for societal risk estimation.  
 
 
Figure 10. Portfolio model schematizing the chemical plant surrounded 
 by adjacent plants 
 
In the proposed methodology, the first step is performing the process hazard 
analysis which will provide information on all the potential deviating scenarios which 
could lead to explosions having catastrophic impact (Eckhoff, 2005). The calculation of 
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the event probabilities and the consequence estimation for each of the scenarios will 
provide the portfolio risk for all scenarios. The portfolio scenario risks can be classified 
as total tangible risks and total societal and other intangible risks such as reputation loss. 
The tangible risks pertain to all process equipment repairs, lost production, business 
interruption, claims, environmental clean-up and other measurable asset value within the 
portfolio.  
After the estimation of societal risk values such as number of expected fatalities 
and the number of expected injuries for the portfolio models, the societal risks can be 
graphically represented using farmer‘s curves such as the FN-curves, generated to 
indicate the adverse effect of the potential incidents on the public outside the plant. F$- 
curves could also be generated analogous to FN-curves as they would provide the 
measure of financial loss distribution for different potential incidents in a plant. These 
risk curves along with the maximum VaR expected losses would provide the means for 
understanding the stakes at risk for more confident decision making. 
3.1. Scenario Development 
After making an inventory of materials involved and their hazardous properties, a 
process flow sheet and a piping and instrumentation diagram, the hazard and operability 
study (HAZOP) method will have to be utilized to get the top event scenarios because of 
process deviations for the portfolio (AIChE/CCPS, 1992). Hazards and Operability 
(HAZOP) study is the most effective type of PHA and hence will be utilized in this 
research to ensure all potential scenarios are accounted for. HAZOP uses guide words to 
different nodes (sections or units) of the chemical plant to identify deviations 
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(operability problems). HAZOP will be performed using plant operation information and 
P&IDs of the chemical plant of interest. 
3.2. Probability Estimation of Scenarios 
 Probabilities for the undesired events are estimated by logically evaluating the 
series of events (cutsets) potentially leading to the undesired event (top event). The fault 
tree analysis (FTA) method effectively estimates the top event scenario probability 
(AIChE/CCPS, 1992). The failure rates from the CCPS and OREDA databases can be 
utilized to calculate the reliability of sub-systems leading to the top event. The failure of 
equipment generally corresponds to the basic events of a fault tree such as failure of 
equipment or human error. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) could also be employed for the 
deduction of potential catastrophic scenarios. ETA is similar to FTA except that the 
basic events are progressively built upon to obtain various deviating scenarios; each 
assigned its probability of occurrence (AIChE/CCPS, 1992; AIChE/CCPS, 2000).  
3.3. Consequence Estimation  
Source models will be utilized to calculate the discharge rate and total quantity of 
the material released. The chemical engineering principles of thermodynamics, reaction 
kinetics and transport phenomenon govern the principles behind the dispersion models 
that describe the material transportation downwind from its source release. Fire and 
explosion models will be used to estimate information such as thermal radiation, energy 
and overpressure. Estimation of the type of release, the quantity of release and its 
subsequent overpressure estimation if explosion occurs would enable the quantification 
of its impact to the surroundings of the plant. Adverse consequences i.e., the number of 
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fatalities and damage to buildings will be estimated from the probit (probability unit for 
damages) models (Mannan, 2005). Conservative (worst case) approach will be adopted 
while using the consequence models. Crowl and Louvar (2002), Lees Loss Prevention in 
the Process Industries (Mannan, 2005) and CCPS guidelines for consequence analysis of 
chemical releases (1994, 1996, 1999, 2000), provide well established source and 
consequence models for various process deviations. FN-curves and F$-curves will be 
developed to understand the consequences for different scenario frequencies. 
Developing the FN-curves and F$- curves for historical catastrophic incidents in the 
process industry will also help better understand the societal consequence trends. This 
could also help understand the societal risk aversion for certain process types of 
chemical industry processes. 
3.4. Societal Risk Representation 
Societal risk is the adverse impact (or consequence) on the society that could 
results from a potential chemical accident. SR for catastrophes could be in terms of 
fatalities, injuries, negative societal image of industry, environmental damages, etc. SR 
(fatalities) which cannot be directly measured in monetary terms is considered as 
intangibles. SR is rarely addressed in the overall risk analysis of a plant even though it is 
considered to be important (HSE, 1989). Some work has been done by HSE and 
researchers in Europe regarding inclusion of SR. However, the SR quantification is 
mostly qualitative. Societal risks are often not considered for risk estimation but its 
importance is nevertheless noted to be highly significant. For this study, even one loss of 
life is considered highly significant and hence one or more fatalities will be considered 
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in the SR estimation models. Modeling fatalities outside plant area has generally not 
been considered by researchers in the past because of its complexity. However, 
including out-of-plant societal risk in the methodology for decision making is important 
and is one of the major objectives of this research.  
Most high impact incidents have resulted in fatalities within a mile of the plant 
area (Kaszniak, Holmstrom and MacKenzie, 2007). Hence, an area of 1 mile radius from 
the portfolio of interest will be considered for SR estimation.SR typically translates into 
societal costs (SC). Hence, by SC estimation the SR could be monetized. Various types 
of damages to buildings, structures etc., which are outside the plant facility, can also be 
expressed in repair and replacement costs. Proposed equation 15 describes the total SC 
for a portfolio given by the summation of n possible societal risks due to damage to 
houses, governmental buildings and other structural buildings in the vicinity of the plant.   
SC = SCAge Groups + SCSchools + SCHospitals + …+ SC(n-1) + SCn)              (15)          
For portfolio model studied in this work, the societal cost resulting from societal 
risks could further be classified into (i) direct societal cost and (ii) indirect societal cost. 
Direct societal cost is the cost of all the tangible damage to structural buildings such as 
hospitals, schools and houses in the residential areas and cleaning up of the environment. 
Indirect societal costs are costs stemming from intangible asset values such as cost of 
averting fatalities, litigation costs and production loss because of company‘s loss of 
reputation. Such intangible asset values become only partly explicit in monetary terms 
and hence the intangible asset values are not considered in monetary terms in this work.  
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3.5. Database Analysis for Lagging Metrics 
Two databases were mined to understand the incident trends in the US chemical 
process industry. The complete interpretations of the information harnessed from the 
databases would be utilized for the generation of societal consequences in terms of 
exceedance frequencies and safety pyramids. This information is valuable to the industry 
because it would enable the understanding of the incident profile in the process industry 
in order to help companies estimate the seriousness of near-misses and consequences of 
incidents occurring in their facilities, and the regulatory agencies to adopt more targeted 
standards for improving industrial safety. Once safety pyramids are generated, the 
relationships between the different consequences in the different tiers of the pyramids 
were studied by utilizing statistical correlations. The collective effect of lower 
consequences in leading to higher consequence incidents (fatality) would also studied by 
performing regression analysis. Fig. 11 shows the overview of objectives of RMP and 
HSEES database analysis in order to provide lagging indicator information to 
complement the leading indicator information in the novel methodology. 
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Figure 11. Overview of objectives of RMP and HSEES database analysis 
 
    The occurrence of the incidents and the size of global losses incurred are random. 
For the selection of the safest alternative or choosing the best risk reduction measures, it 
is therefore important to consider the time value of money. The time value of money for 
various assets could be analyzed using the vonNeumann-Morgenstern expected utility 
theory (vonNeumann and Morgenstern, 1947, 1953). The estimation of portfolio losses 
based on QRA studies, the expected Value-at-Risk of portfolio, the risk curves and the 
database analysis information can be utilized into the decision analyses phase (discussed 
in Section 5 under decision analyses framework) will help the decision maker to choose 
between risky or uncertain options by the comparison of their expected utility values. 
The expected utility values are weighted sums of the multiples of utility values of 
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outcomes (in our case damage loss) and their respective probabilities. The explanation 
for calculating expected values basics for decision theory is provided by Ross (2006).  
The last part of this work is to utilize the QRA-VaR based information for 
decision analysis in the presence of competing portfolios. The basic outline for the 
decision analysis based on QRA and VaR is provided in Fig. 12. The probability and 
consequences from the QRA which is translated into monetary value utilizing VaR 
concepts along with the societal risk curves for both leading and lagging indicators can 
be utilized for decision analysis. Expected utility theory and game theory concepts could 
be applied to choose the most preferred risk portfolio option via identifying dominant 
contributors. 
 
Figure 12. QRA and VaR based decision making framework 
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4. RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
The following section provides results of distillation process separating hexane 
and heptanes in order to explain the methodology for calculating the expected losses of 
assets of a portfolio for scenarios which could result in potential incidents.  This is the 
leading metrics for risk assessment. The lagging metrics for the study provides results 
from analyses of the NRC database and the HSEES database. Both databases provide 
risk curves, basic incident trend information and the safety pyramids for incidents which 
have occurred in the U.S. chemical process industry. The last part of this section will 
focus on the decision analysis framework in applying the expected utility theory and 
game theory principles to chemical process industry for improved decision making in 
order to choose the most preferred risk option. 
4.1. Leading Metrics for Portfolio Risk Assessment  
In order to apply the principles of our novel methodology, the following case 
study provided in the CCPS book on the guidelines for performing a chemical process 
QRA is considered as shown in Fig. 13. The case study involves a distillation column 
consisting of two feed streams of 58% (wt) hexane and 42% (wt) heptane, which are to 
be separated. The detailed description of the process can be found in CCPS – Chemical 
Quantitative Risk Analysis Chapter 8.2. The case study has been modified by the 
authors, in that all the possible scenarios are developed and their respective outcome 
frequencies have been calculated according to the assigned probabilities. For simplicity, 
the low and medium level scenarios are assumed to occur not more than once in a year. 
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It is assumed that the closest neighborhood in the vicinity of the plant housing 200 
people. The population is assumed to be clustered more closely at the vicinity of the 
portfolio. This assumption is valid to study the worst case scenarios. The worst case 
weather having atmospheric stability class F with wind speed up to 1.5 m/s provides the 
most conservative consequence estimates with respect to relative frequencies of 
incidents.  
 
 
Figure 13. Portfolio of hexane-heptane separation process with residential area  
in its vicinity (adapted from AIChE/CCPS, 2000) 
 
 The importance of studying major incidents and monetizing the assets are 
stressed, the   methodology for making business decisions from the economic analysis is 
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developed and the methodology is demonstrated by applying it on a case study. For this 
purpose, credible scenarios and their incident outcome frequencies were first developed. 
The quantified portfolio risks were classified as tangible risks and intangible risks.  The 
tangible risks was monetized and the expected loss using VaR were calculated. The VaR 
values and the economic losses enabled concluding that the column, full bore line 
rupture and the reboiler are the critical assets for risk mitigation in the plant. Societal 
Risk model were developed to account for intangible risk. FN-curve and F$-curve were 
generated according to the consequences of the potential scenario risks. 
In this case study, the distillation column system contains flammable materials. 
Hence, fire and explosion outcomes are considered as potential incidents for which the 
probabilities have been evaluated by event tree analysis method.  Complete rupture of 
column, accumulator, reboiler and condenser are assumed to be the most devastating 
cases leading to fire and explosion scenarios such as BLEVE, VCE and Flash Fires. 
Catastrophic failure and full bore rupture of the vessels are assumed to provide similar 
consequences assuming that in both cases all the contents of the vessels are 
instantaneously released. The details of the consequences of scenarios are explained in 
case study 2 of the CCPS guidelines for chemical process quantitative risk assessment 
(2000).  
For the monetization of plant assets, five equipment are considered in the plant 
facility. The total tangible cost owing to the lost production time in the event of an 
incident is calculated based on the losses accrued because of the failure of the 
equipment. In a chemical plant the asset prices are fixed and hence the statistical 
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variation of asset prices is considered to be unchanging. Table 2 lists the equipment 
considered for this case study and their asset values with the lost time of production in 
case of failure. 
 
Table 2. Cost of portfolio assets 
Equipment Cost ($) 
No. 
present 
Final Cost 
( $ ) 
Lost Prod. 
Time (days) 
  
 
  
 
  
Accumulator 40,000 1 40,000 60 
Condenser 75,000 1 75,000 90 
Distillation 
Column 
300,000 1 300,000 365 
Piping (per ft.) 100 4000 ft 400000 180 
Reboiler 65,000 1 65,000 30 
  
Total 880,000 
  
 
 Once the different equipment along with their cost and the minimum lost time of 
production is accounted for, the next step is to assess the different credible scenarios that 
could result in potential incidents. In this work, a series of scenarios ranging from low to 
medium to high risk are deduced by utilizing the event tree analysis type of PHA 
method. The event tree for the incident is adopted from the CCPS guidelines example 
(2000) as shown in Fig. 14. If we consider an instantaneous release from equipment, 
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e.g., column, then it could immediately find an ignition source or could have no 
immediate ignition source available. The contents of the column are flammable and 
hence there is a good chance that if the liquid were to instantaneously release and if there 
is ignition source it could result in a BLEVE. Similarly if there is delayed ignition based 
on the type of release and the amount released, the consequence could be either a VCE 
or a flash fire. It is rarity to have no available ignition source in the process facilities as 
seen in many historical incidents. Event tree analysis method was used to deduce 
credible scenarios for different equipment for the hexane-heptane process. 
  
Figure 14. Event tree analysis for potential portfolio incidents 
 
The different credible scenarios deduced from ETA method are used for each 
equipment in the facility. For different equipment, scenarios which could lead to low, 
medium and high risk incidents. The incident consequences for each of the scenarios are 
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also identified. For example, for a credible scenario of small leak in reboiler, the possible 
consequences could be slip hazard if the flammable leak finds no ignition source. In case 
of ignition of the contents of the leak for an hour, a small fire could result. In the event 
of this incident, it is assumed that the reboiler could have minor damage and the reboiler 
could be out of service for a minimum of 2 days. In this manner different scenarios along 
with their incident consequences are provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Potential scenarios and the consequences based on event tree analysis 
Scenario  Incident consequence 
Small leak in reboiler Slip hazard, possible small fire; lasting 1 hour; 2 days production loss 
Small leak in piping Slip hazard, possible small fire; lasting 2 hours; 1 week production loss 
Accumulator tube leak Slip hazard, possible small fire; 0.5 day production loss 
Reboiler leak, continuous 
release 
Slip hazard, possible small fire; lasting 2 hours; 1 
week production loss 
Column overhead liquid leak, 
continuous release, immediate 
ignition 
Possible flash fire; can be quickly extinguished, 
damage repaired in one day 
Column shell vapor leak, 
continuous release, delayed 
ignition 
Possible flash fire; can be quickly extinguished, 
damage repaired in one day 
Condenser tube leak, vapor 
release, immediate ignition 
  Possible jet fire; lasting 1 hour; 1 day production 
loss 
Catastrophic reboiler failure, 
instantaneous release, 
immediate ignition 
  Possible BLEVE followed by fire; damage to 
surrounding equipment; 2 months out of 
production 
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Table 3. (Contd) 
Scenario  Incident consequence 
Full bore rupture of pipe, 
delayed ignition, instantaneous 
release 
 Possible VCE followed by fire; 3 months out of 
production 
Catastrophic column failure, 
instantaneous release, 
immediate ignition   Possible BLEVE; 12 months loss of production 
Catastrophic rupture of 
column, continuous release, 
delayed ignition   Possible VCE, 12 months of production 
 
The next step is to estimate the probability of loss and incident outcome 
frequencies for each of the incidents. In the case study, the probability loss is assumed 
based on information from CCPS (2000). The incident frequencies which are provided in 
the CCPS guidelines for QRA is utilized for the different scenarios based on the type of 
consequences and the dominant wind direction. The probability of occurrence of each 
incident is multiplied with the relevant incident frequency to obtain the final incident 
outcome frequency. This is shown in Table 4. Generally probability loss are estimated 
based on expert judgment and historical information. Frequencies are estimated from 
equipment reliability and failure rate data. For clarity, the different incident types are 
color coded to match the incidents listed in Table 2. For example, the incident type 
entitled ―High 1‖, which relates to catastrophic reboiler failure as previously shown in 
Table 3 is assumed to have a probability of occurrence of 0.3 with the incident frequency 
of 2.30E-05 which results in an incident outcome frequency of 6.90E-06.  
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Table 4. Incident types with loss probabilities and incident outcome frequencies 
  Incident Type     Pr. Loss Incident Freq (yr-1) 
Incident 
Outcome Freq 
(yr
-1
) 
Low 1 0.70 3.70E-04 2.59E-04 
Low 2 0.80 3.70E-04 2.96E-04 
Low 3 0.75 3.70E-04 2.78E-04 
Low 4 0.85 3.70E-04 3.15E-04 
Medium 1 0.45 2.30E-05 1.04E-05 
Medium 2 0.75 2.30E-05 1.73E-05 
Medium 3 0.46 2.30E-05 1.06E-05 
Medium 4 0.4 2.30E-05 9.20E-06 
High 1 0.30 2.30E-05 6.90E-06 
High 2 0.4 2.30E-05 9.20E-06 
High 3 0.25 2.30E-05 5.75E-06 
High 4 0.35 2.30E-05 8.05E-06 
 
Generally, source and consequence models are utilized to estimate the 
consequence information such as the amount of leak, the resulting overpressure, the area 
affected by the resulting fire or explosion and the number of people affected. In the case 
study, the consequences estimated from the CCPS book is utilized for simplicity. If a 
BLEVE were to result about 60,000lb of flammable liquid is estimated to be released 
with a diameter of 600ft and fire height of 450ft. If a VCE were to result, then the radius 
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of the are affected by explosion would be 800ft with an overpressure of 3psi. If the leak 
is smaller then it could result in a flash fire with diameter of about 480ft centered at 
270ft downwind. In case of jet fire, the diameter of are affected is about 100ft. It is 
evident from these results that explosions are more severe in causing potential damage to 
facility and residential area in the plant vicinity where as the jet fire would have no 
potential threat to residential areas.   
Table 5 provides information about the different incidents with cumulative 
probabilities and assumed societal consequences. The incident outcome frequencies for 
the 12 different scenarios listed in Tables 2 and 3 are utilized to calculate the incident 
outcome probability and the cumulative probability density values. The assumed societal 
losses in terms of fatalities include people both inside and outside the plant facility. The 
assumption of fatalities for low risk incidents is extreme but is thus chosen to assess the 
risk aversion using UK-HSE intolerability criterion lines for fatalities that could occur in 
case of low risk scenarios. For higher risk scenarios large number of fatalities is assumed 
as is the case for major historical catastrophes. 
 
Table 5. Incidents with cumulative probabilities and societal consequences 
Incident 
Outcome 
Freq. 
(1/yr) 
Incident 
outcome 
probability, 
pdf 
Cum. 
probability 
density, cdf 
Societal 
Loss 
(people) 
2.59E-04 1.04E-03 1.04E-03 1 
2.96E-04 1.18E-03 2.22E-03 3 
2.78E-04 1.11E-03 3.33E-03 5 
3.15E-04 1.26E-03 4.59E-03 10 
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Table 5. (Contd) 
Incident 
Outcome 
Freq. 
(1/yr) 
Incident 
outcome 
probability, 
pdf 
Cum. 
probability 
density, cdf 
Societal 
Loss 
(people) 
1.04E-05 4.16E-05 4.63E-03 12 
1.73E-05 6.92E-05 4.70E-03 15 
1.06E-05 4.24E-05 4.75E-03 20 
9.20E-06 3.68E-05 4.78E-03 25 
6.90E-06 2.76E-05 4.81E-03 75 
9.20E-06 3.68E-05 4.85E-03 100 
5.75E-06 2.30E-05 4.87E-03 150 
8.05E-06 3.22E-05 4.90E-03 200 
 
 
The final outcome is to estimate the total expected monetary loss for incident 
scenarios by using the business interruption loss and the plant asset damage loss in the 
event of equipment failure. Table 6 provides the information for calculating the total loss 
with business interruption for each potential incident scenarios. The first step is 
estimating the sales revenue by multiplying production cost and product price. Total 
production cost is calculated with the fixed and variable production costs. The capital 
investment is calculated next, based on the nominal capacity investment and the 
production capacity. The value of depreciation is calculated for a time period of 10 
years. The next step is calculation of the required cash flow using the capital investment 
and the nominal capacity investment. The total loss is calculated for each of the 
equipment based on lost time of production and business interruptions based on loss of 
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turnover. The total loss is based on initial investment, lost capital and clean-up costs. 
The liability costs are excluded in this study which would be additional costs.  
 
Table 6. Sequence of equations to calculate the total loss with business interruption 
 
 
Table 7 shows the calculations for the case study asset loss for different potential 
incident scenarios based on information provided in the previous table. Cash flow that is 
taxable is calculated using the operating cost, the maintenance, energy, overheads, 
support and insurance. Based on the assumed values, the variable production cost is 
estimated at $63mil for a production capacity of 1.2 mil lb/yr of desired component. 
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Table 7. Case study asset loss calculations 
Loss 
calculations 
 
       Amount 
Production capacity A 
      1,200,000 lb/yr 
Product 
price,     B 
   
  $ 520 
Sales revenue, A*B  
    $ 624,000,000 
Prod.Costs, fixed with Fixed Capital investment = 4.6 * 
equipment cost 
$ 4,103,200 
Prod.Costs, variable 
      $ 63,000,000 
Prod.Costs, total, C 
  
  $ 67,103,200 
Nominal capacity 
investment 
    $ 500/ (lb/yr) 
Capital investment plant, D  
  
  $ 600,000,000 
Depreciation 10 yr, 0.1D 
    $ 60,000,000/yr 
Cash Flow required: 3*Investment D/10yr  
 
  $ 90,000,000/yr 
Cash Flow (before tax), 
A*B-C 
     $ 556,896,800/yr 
Cash flow, taxable, A*B-C-
0.1D 
  
  $ 496,896,800/yr 
Tax, 40%   
    $ 198,758,720/yr 
Operating labour 
  
  $ 20,000,000/yr 
Maintenance   
    $ 7,000,000/yr 
Energy, overheads, support, insurance etc. 
 
  $ 20,000,000/yr 
Production costs, fixed 
     $ 47,000,000/yr 
Raw mats, prod.costs, 
variable 
      $ 63,000,000/yr 
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Based on the lost time of production that is assumed, the total loss due to 
catastrophic failure for every equipment is calculated. Here, estimation of the percentage 
of business interruption to the total cost for loss indicated that the distillation column is 
the most critical equipment. In this case, the cost of equipment assumed is small 
compared to the total capital investment of plant. Therefore, the investment costs for the 
equipment are similar when rounded to the nearest million. In case of the failure of the 
equipment due to an incident, the capital lost is assumed to be 60% of the investment 
cost including the equipment. This is assumed as the conservative estimate for losses 
incurred from incidents. Business interruption costs are inclusive of equipment loss 
production time, cash flow before tax and fixed production cost. The total loss includes 
the initial investment, the capital lost due to failure of the equipment and the cost of 
clean-up excluding liability costs.  
According to calculations shown in Table 8, the worst expected losses for this 
case study is $181 million from BLEVE due to column failure and $90 million from 
VCE because of full bore pipe rupture. The worst case loss because of reboiler failure 
and BLEVE is $30 and $21 million from VCE due to instantaneous release of contents 
from column failure. These values support the fact that as the severity of the incident 
consequences increases the expected loss to the companies also substantially increases 
for catastrophes. For this case study the full bore rupture of the pipe, the column failure 
and the reboiler failure are the most critical equipment because the failure of these 
equipment leads to major losses and adverse societal consequences. 
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Table 8. Probability and asset loss with business interruption (BI) for different scenarios 
Incident Event Pr. Loss 
Incident 
Freq 
(1/yr) 
Incident 
Outcome  
freq. 
(1/yr) 
Repairs 
and 
replace  BI ($) 
Clean up 
of envi. 
($) 
Loss 
with BI 
(Mil. $) 
($)  
                  
Small leak in 
reboiler 
Slip hazard, 
possible 
small fire; 
lasting 1 
hour; 2 days 
production 
loss 
0.7 3.70E-04 2.59E-04 6,500 1,962,400 100,000 2.07 
Small leak in 
piping 
Slip hazard, 
possible 
small fire; 
lasting 2 
hours; 1 
week 
production 
loss 
0.8 3.70E-04 2.96E-04 40,000 6,868,402 200,000 7.11 
Accumulator 
tube leak 
Slip hazard, 
possible 
small fire; 
0.5 day 
production 
loss 
0.75 3.70E-04 2.78E-04 4,000 490,600 100,000 0.59 
Reboiler 
leak, 
continuous 
release 
Slip hazard, 
possible 
small fire; 
lasting 2 
hours; 1 
week 
production 
loss 
0.85 3.70E-04 3.15E-04 65,000 6,868,402 200,000 7.13 
Large liquid 
leak from 
piping, 
instantaneou
s release, 
delayed 
ignition 
Possible 
flash fire; 
lasting 5 
hours; 2 
weeks 
production 
loss 
0.45 2.30E-05 1.04E-05 400,000 13,736,803 200,000 14.34 
Column 
overhead 
liquid leak, 
continuous 
release, 
immediate 
ignition 
Possible 
flash fire, 
no blast; 
can be 
quickly 
extinguishe
d, damage 
repaired in 
one day 
0.75 2.30E-05 1.73E-05 300,000 981,200 0 1.28 
Column shell 
vapor leak, 
continuous 
release, 
delayed 
ignition 
Possible jet 
fire; 1 week 
loss of 
production 
0.46 2.30E-05 1.06E-05 300,000 6,868,402 500,000 7.67 
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Table 8. (Contd) 
Incident Event Pr. Loss 
Incident 
Freq 
(1/yr) 
Incident 
Outcome  
freq. 
(1/yr) 
Repairs 
and 
replace  BI ($) 
Clean up 
of envi. 
($) 
Loss 
with BI 
(Mil. $) 
($)  
Condenser 
tube leak, 
vapor 
release, 
immediate 
ignition 
Possible jet 
fire; lasting 
1 hour; 1 
day 
production 
loss 
0.4 2.30E-05 9.20E-06 75,000 981,200 100,000 1.16 
Catastrophic 
reboiler 
failure, 
instantaneous 
release, 
immediate 
ignition 
Possible 
BLEVE 
followed by 
fire; 
damage to 
surrounding 
equipment; 
2 months 
out of 
production 
0.3 2.30E-05 6.90E-06 16,250 29,436,007 1,000,000 30.45 
Full bore 
rupture of 
pipe, delayed 
ignition, 
instantaneous 
release 
Possible 
VCE 
followed by 
fire; 3 
months out 
of 
production  
0.37 2.30E-05 8.51E-06 400,000 89,289,220 1,000,000 90.69 
Catastrophic 
column 
failure, 
delayed 
ignition, 
continuous 
ignition 
Possible 
BLEVE; 12 
months loss 
of 
production 
0.25 2.30E-05 5.75E-06 300,000 
 
 
180,540,840 1,000,000 181.84 
 
Catastrophic 
rupture of 
column, 
instantaneous 
release, 
delayed 
ignition 
Possible 
VCE, 6 
months of 
production 
0.35 2.30E-05 8.05E-06 150,000 20,605,205 500,000 21.26 
 
Table 9 shows the calculations of losses for plant units along with BI losses. The 
clean-up cost was estimated to be 50,000 for all scenarios for simplicity but this value 
could differ in actuality. The equipment loss percentage because of BI was calculated 
 76 
and it is seen that the most critical equipment is the column followed by the piping and 
the condenser. The total percentage of loss due to business interruption compared to the 
overall loss is estimated to be 19% for this case study.  
 
Table 9. Loss for plant units along with BI for scenarios 
Unit 
Clean 
up  
(Mil $) 
Total 
loss 
 (Mil $) 
Business 
interruption 
(Mil $) 
Total 
with 
BI 
(Bil $) 
BI - % 
total loss 
      Accumulator 0.050 958 92 1.1 9% 
Condenser 0.050 958 138 1.1 13% 
Distillation 
Column 0.050 956 561 1.5 37% 
Piping (per ft.) 0.050 958 277 1.2 22% 
Reboiler 0.050 958 46 1.0 5% 
  
Total 1114 5.9 19% 
 
 
Table 10 shows the Portfolio equipment with maximum lost days of production 
to estimate the upper bounds for BI loss for individual equipment and the plant facility 
as a whole. The distillation column is assumed to be out of service for 3 years in the 
event of a catastrophe followed by the reboiler at 1.5 years out of service and the 
condenser 9 months. The number of days for repairing piping is still assumed the same 
as before because it is assumed that it takes the same amount of time to repair pipework.  
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Table 10. Portfolio equipment with maximum lost days of production to estimate 
the upper bounds BI loss 
Unit  Lost Prod. Time (days) 
Accumulator 180 
Condenser 270 
Distillation Column 1095 
Piping (per ft.) 180 
Reboiler 450 
 
 
Table 11 shows the calculation of losses for plant equipment with BI loss with 
maximum number of days of lost time of production in case of catastrophic incidents. 
The cleanup cost is assumed to be $ 50,000 for all scenarios for simplicity in this case 
also. The equipment loss percentage because of BI is calculated and it can be seen that 
the most critical equipment once again is the column followed by the reboiler and the 
condenser. However, the total percentage of loss due to business interruption compared 
to the overall loss is estimated to be 40%. The BI loss for distillation column is estimated 
at 63% and reboiler at 41%. For catastrophic incidents, the number of lost days of 
production is much greater and hence the losses because of BI for individual equipment 
and portfolio as a whole is also higher, as expected. 
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Table 11. Upper bound loss for plant units along with BI   
 Equipment 
Liability 
& 
cleanup 
(Mil $) 
Total 
loss 
(Mil $) 
Business 
Interruption 
(BI) (Mil $) 
Total 
loss 
with 
BI (Bil 
$)  
BI % 
total loss 
Accumulator 0.05 958 265 1.2 22% 
Condenser 0.05 958 397 1.4 29% 
Distillation 
Column 0.05 958 1611 2.6 63% 
Piping (per ft.) 0.05 957 265 1.2 22% 
Reboiler 0.05 958 662 1.6 41% 
  Total 3200 8 40% 
 
 
Fig. 15 shows the losses incurred if the different scenarios were realized. Low 
risk incidents have the lowest loss. Medium and high risk incidents have greater losses 
both in terms of damage to equipment and fatalities (as shown in figure 9). The 95% 
VaR gives a loss of $7mil/yr (i.e., 95% confidence that losses do not exceed $7 mil/yr) 
and the 99% VaR gives a loff of $90mil/yr (i.e., 99% confidence that loss will not exceed 
$90mil/yr).  Values exceeding the cut-off limits are the VaR break values. Any scenario 
above the chosen cut-off must include risk mitigation measures to reduce risks. BLEVE 
and VCE are most serious types of explosions causing severe societal consequences and 
economic loss. It is the choice of the decision maker to choose the  most preferred 
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confidence level that is accpetable under different circumstances. Hence, if the decision 
maker is more risk averse, 95% confidence limit is chosen as the cut-off beyond which 
all other scenarios risks are mitigated by adopting rigorous risk reduction measure.  In 
this case choosing the more risk averse 95% confidence level for VaR is more 
conservative. Using this confidence limit also indicates that the most critical equipment 
failures are the full bore pipe rupture, the column and reboiler failures. 
 
 
Figure 15. Cumulative probability and VaR with total BI 
 
The FN-curves and the F$-curves both indicate that the damage to society and 
the company are interrelated and show similar trends. As the number of fatalities 
increases, the economic loss of the company increases analogously. The number of 
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potential fatalities in this case study includes workers from within the plant as well as the 
people outside the plant. If it is assumed that the road running parallel, next to the plant 
has many people travelling in the peak hours of traffic, then, for catastrophic scenarios, 
we assume that in-plant fatalities is a maximum of five. 
In this case study, FN-curve is plotted for each potential accident based on the 
values of fatalities assumed. Fig. 16 shows the FN-curve for the scenarios with UK and 
Dutch intolerable criterion lines.  Applying the UK intolerable criteria, it is observed that 
it is never acceptable to have fatalities resulting from low risk scenarios. The medium 
risks fall below the intolerable line; however, they are in the ALARP region indicating 
that the risks should be decreased to the lowest possible level. The high risk scenarios 
generally all fall above the intolerable line, indicating that such multiple societal losses 
is unacceptable based on the scenario occurrence frequencies. Applying the Dutch 
intolerable criterion line, which is only for societal losses outside plant vicinity, it is 
observed that all the scenarios fall above the stringent criterion line with slope of -2. 
Regardless of the criterion, it is important to note that these criterion lines are more like 
guidelines for implementing safety measures for risk mitigation. Hence, monetization of 
losses should also be included in the decision making process and not just FN-curves. 
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Figure 16. FN-curve for the scenarios with UK and Dutch intolerable criterion lines 
 
 
Applying the UK intolerable criteria to Fig. 17 showing all criterion lines for the 
FN-curve as per UK-HSE, it is seen that having fatalities for lower risk events is 
unacceptable. The medium risk values, fall below the intolerable line in the As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) region. The ALARP region in the UK criterion lines is 
the region in between the intolerable and the tolerable line, where the risks are 
considered tolerable but, should be further decreased whenever possible. The four 
medium risk data points within the ALARP region indicate that the risks should be 
decreased to a level which is ―as low as reasonably practicable‖. Here, the high risk 
UK-HSE 
Dutch 
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scenarios are those which clearly have high consequence and low probability. These 
extreme risk event data points all fall above the intolerability line, indicating that proper 
safety measures must be sought to decrease the portfolio risks. If suitable protection 
devices are implemented in the plant facilities, these risk levels can be brought closer to 
the tolerable criterion line given that the required cost for implementing appropriate 
protection devices and safety measures are available. Similar to the UK-HSE criterion 
lines, the Dutch regulatory body also utilizes criterion lines except with a risk aversion 
factor of negative slope of 2. However, the Dutch criterion lines only apply to loss of life 
outside the plant facility without including the loss of life within the plant facility 
(Vrijling & van Gelder, 1989; Stallen, Geerts, & Vrijling, 1996). The focus of this work 
is establishing a novel methodology for risk-informed decision making for entire 
portfolio and hence the Dutch criterion is not applicable for this study.  
 
 
        Figure 17. FN-curve showing all criterion lines as per UK-HSE 
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The criterion lines are more like guidelines for implementing safety measures for 
risk mitigation (Evans & Verlander, 1997; Trbojevic, 2005). Hence, in this work, 
monetized asset loss in the form of VaR curve and F$-curve are also included along with 
the FN-curve. In Fig. 18, the frequency of exceedance curve in monetary terms for asset 
losses pertaining to different scenarios is shown. The cost of the incident increases with 
the severity of the incident consequence. The F$-curves also fall from left to right 
similar to FN-curves indicating that the two curves could be correlated. If a correlation 
indeed exists, it would be valuable to generate FN-curves and F$-curves for historical 
accidents, which generally have information about the number of fatalities (N) and the 
amount of loss ($). Generation of such curves for historical incidents would be beneficial 
for studying the trends in the industry frequency of occurrence of similar historical 
incidents.  
 
 
Figure 18. F$-curve for all portfolio scenarios 
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4.2. Lagging Metrics for Portfolio Risk Assessment  
Federal regulation, 40 CFR Part 68, has required industrial facilities using large 
amounts of extremely hazardous substances to file a Risk Management Plan with the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2009). This information is then categorically 
populated in its national information system known as the RMP database. According to 
the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 section 112r, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) is required to publish regulations for chemical accident prevention in 
facilities with hazardous substances (EPA, 2009; Kleindorfer et al., 2007). The Risk 
Management Program focuses on reducing chemical incident risks at the local level, to 
aid emergency responders in developing strategic preparedness and response plan and to 
educate the general public about the chemical hazards.  
The RMP database includes incident information for fixed facilities which are 
reported from the chemical and petroleum sectors of the process industry. An incident is 
reportable in the RMP if it involves the release of more than the specified threshold 
quantity of the chemical defined under the RMP rule. Furthermore, the incidents should 
have taken place within five years from the date of its submission and must have resulted 
in consequences such as deaths, injuries, evacuation, and/or property damage (Elliott et 
al., 2008). The total number of facilities covered under the RMP rule is approximated to 
be 14,000 facilities (Kleindorfer et al., 2007). All 50 US states having facilities covered 
under the RMP rule must report incidents to the RMP. An average number of 158 
incidents were reported per year in the RMP between 1994 and 2009. 
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The facilities covered under the RMP rule are similar to the European Union 
facilities covered under the Seveso II Directive (Wettig & Porter, 1998). The Seveso 
Directive is established to control major accident hazards involving dangerous 
substances and to limit consequences for man and the environment by increasing 
community protection both effectively and consistently (Wetting & Porter, 1998). 
Hence, both the RMP and the Seveso Directive exists to reduce the number and 
consequences of process incidents and prevent damages. The data collected from the 
Seveso II Directive plants are utilized to perform full-fledged quantitative risk 
assessment leading to the generation of risk curves such as FN-curves by the Dutch 
National Institute for Public Health and Environment to understand the severity of the 
accident consequences (Natuurplanbureau, 2004).   
Facilities covered under the EPA-RMP Rule are obligated to report incidents if 
their consequences exceed the specified damage criteria. Initially the facilities covered 
under the RMP Rule could report the accident data populated in the facility for five years 
by June 1999, which was the first wave of filing. However, the time to report an incident 
was amended to within six months of the date of the occurrence of the incident and the 
facilities were needed to submit the incidents by June 2004, which was the second wave 
of accumulated accident filing (Kleindorger at al., 2007). The third wave of reported 
incidents was filed by 2009. Under both rules, the facilities covered have to report 
incidents which exceed the specified threshold of consequences. However, there exists a 
more stringent rule for the facilities to report incidents under the Seveso II Directive than 
the facilities under the EPA-RMP Rule. For example, single fatalities and 
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hospitalizations under 24 hours are reportable under RMP Rule while they are not 
required by the Seveso II Directive (Wettig & Porter, 1998). The RMP reportable 
incidents could be considered as ―near-misses‖ in comparison to Seveso II incidents 
(Kleindorfer et al., 2007). The analysis of RMP database could help draft better 
regulations and policy conclusions about the nature and consequences of accidental 
chemical releases in US facilities. Hence, the study of EPA-RMP database is 
significantly important. 
The other database studied in this work is the Hazardous Substance Emergency 
Events Surveillance (HSEES) from the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease 
Registry (ATSDR). The HSEES database was established in 1990 to collect acute 
releases of hazardous substances requiring cleanup or neutralization and threatened 
releases resulting in events such as evacuations. The goal of HSEES as the only federal 
database for addressing health effects from hazardous substance releases is to reduce the 
accident related mortality and injury rates experienced by employees, emergency 
responders and general public. There is no specification of threshold limit for hazardous 
chemicals released in facilities to be reportable to HSEES database and hence the 
number of facilities which can report to HSEES is greater than that of the RMP database. 
On an average about fifteen participating states report about 8000 hazardous 
substance incidents annually in the HSEES database. The fifteen states are Alabama, 
Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Information such as 
the chemical released as primary compound or secondary or tertiary compound, the time 
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and place of release, weather circumstances, the number of major injuries, the number of 
deaths and public health action such as evacuation are reported by facilities (Kleindorfer 
et al., 2007). 
The HSEES data incorporate all incidents resulting in releases and consequences 
critical for identifying, preventing, and mitigating the consequences of potential 
incidents. The information collected in HSEES can help management in planning better 
accident prevention strategies. It can also be utilized by regulatory agencies to develop 
and pass standards more strategically focused to reduce serious consequences from 
hazardous substance releases. Hence, the study of HSEES database is invaluable. The 
next section explains the analysis performed by utilizing the two accident databases.  
In this work, information such as the number of incidents, number of  njuries, 
number of people hospitalized and treated, number of evacuations and shelter in-place, 
as reported in both the databases were utilized for analysis. From the two databases, the 
reported incidents considered were from the alkali manufacturing, chlorine 
manufacturing, basic organic and inorganic chemical manufacturing, cyclic crude and 
intermediate manufacturing, ethyl alcohol manufacturing, fertilizer, industrial gas, 
fertilizer manufacturing, pharmaceutical, medicine and polystyrene manufacturing. 
Petroleum refinery related sectors including LNG extraction, oil and gas extraction, all 
pipeline transportation of LNG and all other petrochemical manufacturing were 
considered as available only in the RMP database.  
From the RMP data, all the petrochemical industry events were collectively 
analyzed and then only the petroleum industry related events were analyzed separately. 
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In this work, a total of 2,623 data points representing chemical manufacturing/processing 
and petroleum refining incidents reported in the RMP from 1994 to 2009 were analyzed. 
About 33,000 data were studied from HSEES database from 1996 to 2004. The persons, 
who are hospitalized and treated without immediately being discharged after treatment, 
were considered as major injuries. The symptoms or injuries because of hazardous 
substance releases, where persons are treated and immediately released from hospitals, 
were considered as minor injuries. Evacuations were considered as low consequences 
where as high consequences were considered to be injuries and deaths. In the RMP 
database, the numbers of people evacuated and sheltered in place are available whereas 
in the HSEES database only the number of people evacuated are available. Hence, the 
information as provided is utilized for data analyses in this study.  
Both the RMP and HSEES databases were analyzed for the number of annual 
incidents reported along with the total number of annual injuries. The different initiating 
causes of failure leading to the incidents were analyzed to understand the percentage of 
incidents occurring because of reasons such as equipment failure and human error. The 
societal losses were analyzed by generating the relationship between exceedance 
frequencies along with fatalities and injuries. These relationships are solely measures of 
exceedance frequencies of incident consequences with respect to the number of years of 
data analyzed. In case of the RMP database, additionally, the exceedance frequencies are 
generated for incident consequences based on the number of years of data reported and 
the average number of facilities covered under the RMP rule. In the databases all single 
fatalities are accounted for, all double and triple fatalities are also accounted for to get 
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the total number of ‗n‘ occurrences reported. Once the different ‗n‘ were accounted for, 
the number of facilities (for RMP its 14,000) and number of years of data(16 yrs) were 
used to estimate frequency values. Then the frequencies were ordered from highest to 
the least and were summed to get cumulative frequencies in order to generate 
exceedance curves (cumulative distribution curves) as double log graphs. They are 
exceedance curves because a random variable (N) occurring will still be measured 
against these values (n) for assessing the severity of the consequence of that random 
variable, i.e., S(n) = Pr (N > n). The different accident consequences were utilized as 
reported in the databases to generate the safety pyramids. Furthermore, the relationships 
between the different consequences in the different tiers of the pyramids were studied by 
utilizing statistical correlations.   
The collective effect of lower consequences in leading to high consequence 
(fatality) was also studied by performing regression analysis. The complete 
interpretation of the information harnessed from the databases which are utilized for the 
generation of societal consequences in terms of exceedance frequencies and safety 
pyramids, enable the understanding of the incident profile in the process industry in 
order to help companies estimate the seriousness of near-misses and consequences of 
incidents occurring in their facilities, and the regulatory agencies to adopt more targeted 
standards for improving industrial safety.   
4.2.1. RMP and HSEES databases annual accident statistics 
In this work, the three tranches of reported incidents in the RMP from 1994 to 
2009 were collectively studied to understand the incident profile.  The data analyzed 
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from HSEES database relate to events that were reported from 1996 to mid-2004 (Prem, 
Ng & Mannan, 2010). 
Fig. 19 shows the total chemical process industry reported incidents in 
comparison with the petroleum industry related incidents. From this figure it can be seen 
that there is a steady decline in the number of incidents reported in the process industry 
as a whole as well as in the petroleum industry from 1998 to 2000. From 2000 to 2003, 
the numbers of incidents reported were about the same. In 2004, there is an increase in 
the reported incidents with a maximum of about 250 reported incidents. From 2004 to 
2008, the average number of reported incidents was about 200 incidents. The proportion 
of the number of incidents reported by the petroleum industry in comparison with the 
total number of reported petrochemical incidents remains constant and shows a 
decreasing trend from 2002 to 2009. One reason for this decline might be due to the 
establishment of safety management programs such as the RMP rule for improving on-
site safety.  
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Figure 19. Total  number of petrochemical  and petroleum incidents reported 
 annually in the RMP database 
 
            Fig. 20 shows the trend in the number of reported injuries for the entire process 
industry in comparison with the reported injuries for the petroleum industry. The 
percentage of reported petroleum injuries to total reported injuries were estimated to 
understand the percentage of petroleum related incidents out of the overall incident 
injuries reported. In 2001, out of the total injuries the maximum of 63% injuries were 
attributed to petroleum-related incidents while it was 54% in 1997. According to this 
analysis, more than 50% of the total numbers of reported injuries were from the 
petroleum industry incidents periodically every three to four years. The data point for 
2005 is high owing to the BP Texas City incident reporting. 
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Figure 20. Total number of injuries of petrochemical and petroleum incidents reported 
annually in the RMP database 
 
Fig. 21 shows the chemical process industry related incidents reported in 
HSEES. In this figure, the data for year 2004 is excluded for two reasons: (i) the 2004 
data only depicts incidents until mid-year and (ii) only those states which have reported 
during 1996 and 2004 have been utilized to study the reporting trends. Hence, Louisiana, 
New Jersey and Utah have been excluded for more accurate estimates of the reporting 
trends.  From this figure it can be seen that there is an increase in the number of 
reporting with the maximum number of incidents reported during the year 2002. The 
increasing trend in reporting could be because of two reasons, (i) the actual number of 
incident occurrences themselves increased due to the increasing complexity of the 
technological systems in place, and/or (ii) more facilities would have started reporting to 
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the database as HSEES established itself as reliable database. Nevertheless, in order to 
fully understand the reporting and make concrete conclusions about the industry trends 
based on HSEES database, more years of data are needed for analysis.  
 
 
Figure 21. Total number of incidents reported annually in HSEES database 
 
Fig. 22 shows the chemical process industry related major incidents reported in 
HSEES from 1996 to 2004. According to the reporting, there is an increase in the 
number of major injuries with a maximum of 79 major injuries in the year 2000. 
Initial reporting in 1996 might not accurately represent the actual number of major 
injuries because of the possibility of reluctance to report to a new program. The 
incidents for the year 2004 only accounts for major injuries collected until mid-year. 
From the figure, it can be seen that once again in order to fully understand the 
industry trends, more data in years are needed to be studied. 
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Figure 22. Total number of major injuries reported annually in HSEES database 
 
            Fig. 23 shows the graph of minor injuries reported in HSEES. In this case, the 
number of minor injuries reported is an average number between 400-500 injuries with 
maximum number of minor injuries for the year 2000. In 2000, the number of minor 
injuries reported peaked with approximately 900 cases. Once again it is important to 
note that the analysis of more years of data could provide more detailed information on 
the reporting trends and the number of injuries in the chemical industry. 
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Figure 23. Total number of minor injuries reported in HSEES database 
 
            Fig. 24 shows the percentage of initiating causes of failures resulting in incidents 
for all reported process industry. Equipment failure was the major cause for the 
occurrence of an incident with approximately 57% of all incidents reported to have 
occurred because of equipment failure. The second reason for the incidents to occur was 
because of human error at approximately 37%. Natural and unknown causes for 
incidents were 2% and 4% respectively for all RMP reported industry incidents. 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
In
ju
ri
es
Year
HSEES Reported Minor Injury
 96 
 
Figure 24. Different initiating causes of failures for all reported RMP incidents 
 
            Fig. 25 indicates the different initiating causes of failures leading to reported 
petroleum incidents in the RMP database. The equipment failure resulted in about 58% 
of total incidents with human error contributing to about 37% of all petroleum-related 
incidents. The incidents which occur due to natural and unknown causes accounted for 
2% and 3% respectively. In both cases shown in Figs. 7 and 8, the percentages of 
incidents resulting from each of the initiating causal factors were almost the same with 
major cause of initiating failure to be equipment failure followed by human error. 
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Figure 25. Different causes of failures leading to reported RMP petroleum incidents 
 
            Fig. 26 shows the pie-chart for different causes of failures resulting in incidents 
in the HSEES database. HSEES data collect several other different categories for causes 
of failures which are more specific than the RMP database. The equipment failure 
resulted in about 63% of all incidents, human error accounted for about 21%, deliberate 
damage accounted for about 6% of all incidents and system or process upsets was about 
3%. Other causes including bad weather collectively resulted in about 7% of the reported 
incidents. Here damages because of deliberate act are separated from human error. 
Deliberate damage is defined as any damage due to willful or intentional act. If the cause 
for failure were also considered as human error, then the HSEES database compares well 
with the RMP causes for failures. Both databases would then have approximately 60% 
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of incidents caused by equipment failure and about 30% of incidents caused by human 
error.  
 
 
Figure 26. Different causes of failures leading to reported HSEES incidents 
 
4.2.2. Societal loss from database information  
            Fig. 27 shows the relationship between exceedance frequencies and fatalities for 
all covered RMP facilities. This figure provides the profile of the number of fatalities for 
all facilities (approximately 14,000 facilities) per year covered under the RMP rule. The 
curves were generated using the total number of facilities covered under the RMP and 
the number of fatalities that occurred. Data from 1994 to 2009 were considered in order 
to include all the fatalities reported in the RMP database. In this figure, the single fatality 
occurs at an exceedance frequency of about 1/1,000 facilities and the maximum reported 
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fatality of 17 occurs at an exceedance frequency of about 1/10,000 facilities. It is 
noteworthy that neither database has the information on the actual number of employees 
and the number of hours worked. Hence, these exceedance curves are not like the true 
frequency-number curve generated by either the UK HSE or the Dutch TNO for their 
facilities (Health and Safety Executive, 1989; Evans & Verlander, 1997; 
Natuurplanbureau, 2004). These exceedance curves generated here are solely generated 
to study the societal loss trend based on the number of years of data and the number of 
facilities covered in case of RMP database. 
 
 
Figure 27. Relationship between exceedance frequencies and fatalities for all    
covered RMP facilities 
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            Fig. 28 shows the relationship between the exceedance frequencies per year and 
the fatalities for both reported database incidents.  The exceedance curves indicate that 
for low probability events the number of fatalities occurring is greater. The exceedance 
frequencies are calculated per year only because of the unavailability of information of 
the total number of facilities that report to HSEES. From this figure it can be observed 
that the single fatalities for both RMP and HSEES databases occur at higher exceedance 
frequencies, where as multiple fatalities occur at lower exceedance frequencies. Further, 
as the number of fatalities is greater, the exceedance frequencies are almost similar for 
such cases.   
 
 
Figure 28. Relationship between the exceedance frequencies per year and the fatalities 
for both reported database incident 
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            Fig. 29 provides the relationship between exceedance frequencies per facilities-
year and injuries reported in the RMP database. The curves generated indicate a fatality 
for every 10 facilities. Also in comparison to the fatalities, single injuries occur almost 
an order of magnitude more frequently. Multiple injuries occur at a fairly lower 
frequency because major incidents lead to large number of injuries and such events are 
rare events. The relationship between exceedance frequencies and the number of injuries 
for incidents which have occurred in petroleum refineries covered under the RMP Rule 
are also presented. Here, it can be seen once again that single injury occurs at a lower 
frequency per facility for petroleum related injuries than that of the overall 
petrochemical industry. Multiple injuries occur at similar exceedance frequencies for the 
overall petrochemical industry and the petroleum industry incidents. 
 
 
Figure 29. Relationship between exceedance frequencies per facilities-year and injuries 
reported in the RMP database 
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Fig. 30 shows the relationship between exceedance frequencies per year and the 
reported injuries in both databases. From these curves it can be seen that single injuries 
occur at a very high frequency, with almost one injury per day in HSEES.  Again, 
similar to the RMP, the multiple injuries (over 100 injuries) occur at similar exceedance 
frequencies in the HSEES data. This would indicate that facilities in general are more 
risk averse in detecting and preventing incidents which would result in multiple fatalities 
but not single injuries. 
 
 
Figure 30. Relationship between exceedance frequencies per year and reported injuries 
in both databases 
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4.2.3.   Accident propensity and relationship between consequences 
For the sake of comparison of the generated safety pyramids with the safety 
pyramid proposed by Heinrich, only the top three steps or layers of the generated safety 
pyramid are utilized. This is because neither the RMP database nor the HSEES collects 
information about the near-misses. Fatalities are the loss of life reported in the 
databases. In the databases, the major injuries are injuries sustained by persons rendering 
them unfit for work and, being hospitalized and treated for more than 24 hours. 
Hospitalization with immediate release and first aid treatment are considered as minor 
injuries. Evacuations are also considered in the safety pyramids as low consequences of 
reported events to understand the domino theory of Heinrich.  
Fig. 31 shows the safety pyramid for accident statistics for all reported EPA-
RMP incidents. The ratio of fatalities: injuries: hospitalizations: evacuations was 
1:31:109:6470 while the ratio of major injury: minor injury: near-misses in Heinrich 
Pyramid was 1:29:300. If it is assumed that one major injury indicated by Heinrich is an 
actual Fatality, then the results from the generated safety pyramids in this study can be 
comparable with the Heinrich safety pyramid. The major injuries reported in RMP for 
one single fatality is 31 as opposed to 29 from the Heinrich‘s safety pyramid. This could 
imply that, generally more low consequences would eventually have the potential for 
one fatality in facilities covered under RMP rule. This could also indicate that owing to 
the broad base (large number of evacuations), there is greater chance to curtail the 
failures at the low consequence levels before it leads to high consequences in RMP 
facilities. 
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Figure 31. Safety pyramid for accident statistics for all reported EPA-RMP incidents 
 
Fig. 32 shows the safety pyramid for accident statistics reported for petroleum 
industry in the RMP database. The ratio of this safety pyramid is 1:22:41:7013. In 
comparison to the Heinrich‘s safety pyramid, there is large number of ―near-misses‖ in 
terms of evacuations and shelter-in-place because of the broad base. However, the first 
three levels of the safety pyramid are narrow indicating once again that if causal analysis 
of low consequence events are investigated in a timely manner, it would aid in 
preventing or limiting the occurrence of high stakes at risk consequences. So in order to 
prevent serious consequences from resulting, safety measures must be adopted properly 
once the reasons for the evacuations have been investigated. 
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Figure 32. Safety pyramid for accident statistics for petroleum industry reported in 
 EPA-RMP database 
 
            Table 12 shows the proportion of incidents occurring from petroleum-related 
operations and chemical manufacturing/processing to that of the total petrochemical 
incidents reported in the RMP database. In general, the incidents resulting in major 
consequences such as fatalities is of equal proportion  for both petroleum and chemical 
processing incidents even though the number of petroleum incidents is only about 28%. 
About 55% of incidents which caused mass evacuations and shelter-in-place are due to 
petroleum-related incidents. This table shows the seriousness of consequences from 
petroleum-related incidents is greater than chemical processing facilities considering 
that fewer number of petroleum refining incidents are reported.  Hence adequate safety 
measures must be implemented in petroleum refineries because even though fewer 
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accidents result, their consequences are higher. It is noteworthy that there are fewer 
petroleum incidents reported in RMP compared to chemical incidents. However, the 
consequences are almost comparable thereby implying that petroleum industry incidents 
result in more severe consequences because of their large manufacturing or processing 
capacities. 
 
Table 12. EPA-RMP percentage of petroleum and chemical incidents to total 
petrochemical incident consequences  
Consequence Total Petrochemical Chemical %Petroleum %Chemical 
Incidents reported 2528 707 1821 28 72 
Fatalities 87 44 43 51 49 
Total Injuries 2725 961 1764 35 65 
Hospitalization & 
Treatment 9475 1806 7669 19 81 
Evacuation & 
Shelter in place 563015 308561 254454 55 45 
 
 
Fig. 33 shows the safety pyramid for all reported incidents in the HSEES 
database. The ratio between the different consequences is 1:4:35:389. This pyramid is 
narrow and indicates that there is greater chance of high consequences resulting from 
low consequence events because there is insufficient time to investigate the causal 
factors for low consequence events. This could also indicate that there is a greater 
chance that the same scenarios could result in either low consequences or high 
consequences if an accident were to occur. In comparison to the safety pyramid of 
Heinrich, this safety pyramid is narrow with smaller ratios for the different steps of the 
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pyramid. This indicates that there is generally a greater chance of higher consequences 
resulting from incidents reported in HSEES. 
 
 
Figure 33. Safety pyramid for all reported incidents in the HSEES database 
 
Since the HSEES safety pyramid indicates the greater possibility for the low 
consequences resulting from incidents to escalate to high consequence events, the 
HSEES database was studied in details by generating safety pyramids for different types 
of causes for failure which resulted in HSEES incidents. Fig. 34 schematizes the safety 
pyramid from incidents reported in HSEES database as a result of failure due to human 
error. In this case, the safety pyramid has broad base with 34,066 evacuations with 1,652 
minor injuries, 218 major injuries leading to the chance of total of 30 fatalities. The 
incident consequence ratio is 1:7:55:1136 for fatality: major injuries: minor injuries: 
evacuations. This pyramid indicates that generally there is sufficient time to prevent 
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future incidents resulting in more serious consequences if the root causes for the 
incidents resulting in low consequence events are investigated in timely manner. 
 
Figure 34. HSEES safety pyramid for incidents reported because of human error 
            
Fig. 35 depicts the safety pyramid from reported incidents in HSEES because of 
equipment failure. The ratio of this pyramid is 1:10:128:3592. This pyramid has the 
broad base showing ―near-miss‖ incidents or evacuations. This pyramid indicates that 
before serious consequences result from an incident, proper safety measures set in place 
such as reliability studies and maintenance of equipment could greatly decrease the 
probability of occurrence of high consequences. Also, in this case, the tracking of near-
misses and understanding of the causal factors could greatly decrease the chance of low 
consequences of incidents escalating to more serious ones.  
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Figure 35. HSEES safety pyramid for incidents reported because of equipment failure 
             
Fig. 36 shows the safety pyramid generated for reported incidents in HSEES 
which have occurred because of unknown causes. The ratio of this safety pyramid is 
1:3:63:1505. This safety pyramid is narrow at the top three tiers indicating that there is 
sufficient time to identify and rectify the reasons for events causing evacuations thereby 
increasing the chances of limiting the occurrence of events with more serious 
consequences owing to the broad base of the safety pyramid with respect to the top tiers.  
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Figure 36. HSEES safety pyramid for incidents reported because of failure 
 from unknown causes 
             
Fig. 37 shows the HSEES safety pyramid due to failure from natural causes. The 
ratio of this pyramid is 1:2:3:21. This safety pyramid is the narrowest of all.  In this case, 
the stakes at risk due to unknown cause such as hurricane is very high and equally result 
in major and minor consequences. Hence, adequate safety measure must be sought to 
prevent adverse consequences. 
 
                               
Fig. 37. HSEES safety pyramid for incidents reported because of failure from  
natural causes 
 111 
Once the safety pyramids are generated, it is important to understand whether 
there is any relationship between the different steps of the pyramid (i.e., different 
reported consequences). If there is a statistically significant relationship, then it would 
support the domino theory of accident consequences suggested by Heinrich. Therefore, 
the following work focuses on establishing any existing relationship between each of the 
consequences of the safety pyramids and also studies the relationship between high 
consequences such as fatalities with the combined effect of other reported low 
consequences. Hence, the correlation and regression analysis have been performed for 
safety pyramid data for overall incidents reported in both databases using the PASW 
software (formally known as SPSS).  
The correlation matrix for the different consequence types used to generate the 
safety pyramids are shown in Table 13 for HSEES database. The four variables used for 
the correlation are the number of fatalities, the number of major injuries, the number of 
minor injuries and the number of evacuations without the shelter in place. The cells of 
the correlation matrix provide the correlations for all variables in the rows and variables 
in the columns. The first cell having the Pearson correlation coefficient of 1 implies that 
the variable is correlated with itself. This is true along the major diagonal for all 
variables correlated with themselves. The cells along the diagonal are symmetric. For 
other correlations, the Pearson correlation signifies the R value, the significance number 
is the p-value and N is the number of years that have data for both variables. The most 
important information to note from this matrix is that the number of fatalities correlated 
with the number of major injuries and the number of evacuations are statistically 
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significant. Similarly, the correlation between the number of major injuries and number 
of minor injuries are statistically significant and hence there is a valid relationship 
between them. Also, evacuations correlated with number of fatalities and number of 
minor injuries are statistically significant, indicating that there exists a relationship 
between the three variables. Hence, from this matrix it can be concluded that most of the 
variables or indicators have a strong individual correlation with each other in HSEES 
database. 
 
Table 13. HSEES correlation coefficient matrix results from PASW 
  
No. of 
fatalities 
No. of 
major 
injuries 
No. of 
minor 
injuries 
No. of 
evacuations 
without 
shelter- in-
place 
No. of 
fatalities 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 0.655 0.447 0.658 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.055 0.228 0.054 
N 9 9 9 9 
No. of 
major 
injuries 
Pearson 
Correlation 
0.655 1 0.697* 0.495 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.055   0.037 0.176 
N 9 9 9 9 
No. of 
minor 
injuries 
Pearson 
Correlation 
0.447 0.697* 1 0.723* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.228 0.037   0.028 
N 9 9 9 9 
No. of 
evacuations 
without 
shelter in 
place 
Pearson 
Correlation 
0.658 0.495 0.723* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.054 0.176 0.028   
N 9 9 9 9 
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The regression analysis for HSEES was performed with fatalities as the 
dependant variable and the number of major injuries, the number of minor injuries and 
evacuations as the predictor (independent) variables. Very strong collective relationship 
of the predictor variables to the dependent variable was observed implying that the 
number of lower consequence events influences the high consequences. The multiple 
correlation coefficient, R, was 0.82 indicating strong relationship between the predictor 
variables and the dependant variable. The R2 value of 0.67 indicated that 67% of the 
variance in average fatality values could be predicted by the combination of the 
predictor variables.  
The linear multiple regression was performed for four categories of 
consequences from HSEES database to collectively analyze the effect of the predictor 
variables on the dependant variable ‗fatality‘. Equation 1 shows the regression equation 
along with the constant and all coefficients of the predictor variables. The constant value 
of -3.91 in the regression equation indicates that in case of all the predictors being set to 
zero, the resulting fatalities will be negative, i.e., there will be no fatalities.  
However, based on the database analyses of reported incident consequences, 
there is no possibility of having fatalities without lower consequences and this equation 
supports the fact. In other words, whenever there is an incident with the potential to 
result in high consequence such as fatalities, there will more likely also exist low 
consequences such as injuries and evacuations.  
The regression equation indicates the presence of relationship between the lower 
tiers and the upper tiers of the safety pyramid. From the regression equation, it can be 
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seen that the coefficient of the number of major injuries per incident was 0.247 which is 
the value that would be added to the number of expected fatalities in case there was a 
major injury as a result of an accident. In case of one minor injury resulting per incident, 
the value of 0.017 would be deducted from the value of expected fatalities. Similarly, for 
every evacuation made, the expected fatalities value should be increased by a value of 
0.001. The regression equation resulting from the analysis is shown in equation 16. 
                           F = -3.91 + 0.247 X1 – 0.017 X2 + 0.001 X3                             (16) 
where: F = number of fatalities,  
          X1 = number of major injuries per incident,                            
         X2 = number of minor injuries per incident, and  
         X3 = number of evacuation per incident. 
Table 14 shows the pair-wise correlation between the different incident 
consequences reported in the RMP database. From this Table it can be seen that there is 
no significantly statistical individual correlation between the different variables when 
compared two-by-two, except the number of fatalities per year with total evacuations 
and shelter-in-place and, major injuries per year with minor injuries per year. 
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Table 14. EPA-RMP correlation coefficient matrix from PASW 
  
No. 
Fatalities  
No. of 
major 
injuries  
No. of 
minor 
injuries  
No. of 
Evacuations 
and shelter in 
place  
No. of 
fatalities  
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -0.209 -0.33 .721** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.456 0.229 0.002 
N 15 15 15 15 
No. of 
major 
injuries  
Pearson 
Correlation -0.209 1 .913** 0.099 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.456   0 0.727 
N 15 15 15 15 
No. of  
minor 
injuries  
Pearson 
Correlation -0.33 .913** 1 -0.028 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.229 0   0.921 
N 15 15 15 15 
No. of 
evacuations 
and shelter 
in place  
Pearson 
Correlation .721** 0.099 -0.028 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.727 0.921   
N 15 15 15 15 
 
            The regression analysis was performed on the RMP data with fatality as the 
dependent variable and the number of major incidents per incident, number of minor 
injuries per incident and, the number of evacuations and shelter-in-place as the 
independent or predictor variables. The multiple correlation coefficient, R, was 0.79 
indicating the existence of strong relationship between the predictor variables and the 
dependant variable. The R2 value of 0.62 indicates that almost 62% of the variance in 
the average fatalities could be predicted by the combination of the predictor variables.           
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The linear multiple regression was performed for four categories of 
consequences to collectively analyze the effect of the predictor variables on the 
dependent variable ‗fatality‘. Equation 17, shows the regression equation with constant 
value of 2.379, which indicates that in case of all the predictors being set to zero, the 
resulting fatalities is a positive number. However, in reality, this is highly unlikely 
because historically, accidents occur only after a series of near misses and low 
consequences before adverse consequences result. Furthermore, this could indicate that 
the stakes at risk of consequences reported in RMP is greater because of the type of 
incidents reported in the RMP being more serious. The other regression coefficients are 
0.007 for major injuries per incident, which implies the value that would be added to the 
number of expected fatalities in case there was a major injury as a result of an incident. 
In case of one minor injury resulting from an incident, the value of -0.002 would be 
deducted from the value of expected fatalities. Similarly, for every evacuation made, the 
expected fatalities value should be increased by a value of 0.0004. The negative 
coefficients indicate that there is an inverse relationship between fatalities and injuries. 
Most importantly, the equation does indicate that a relationship exists between the 
different tiers of the pyramid which supports the claim of Heinrich (Heinrich, 1940).  
                       F = 2.379 + 0.007 X1 – 0.002 X2 + 0.0004 X3                          (17)    
where, F = number of fatalities, X1 = number of major injuries per incident,                                 
X2 = number of minor injuries per incident,  X3 = number of evacuation and shelter-in-
place per incident. From the analyses of the two databases an attempt has been made to 
understand the frequencies of incidents, their resulting reported consequences 
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particularly the number of fatalities, injuries, evacuations and shelter-in-place (available 
only for RMP) and, develop the relationship between the different consequences which 
make up the safety pyramids. From the study it can be deduced that generally the 
number of incident occurrences reported have decreased annually (especially in the last 
few years) for both databases. The reason for this could be because of the increased 
awareness of process safety and the implementation of risk mitigation measures 
mandated by regulatory.  
The relationship between exceedance frequencies and societal losses were generated 
to understand the societal impact of incidents reported in the two databases. Generally, 
the exceedance curves for fatalities are about one order of magnitude lower than that of 
the exceedance curves for injuries. While the HSEES database has many more 
datapoints than the RMP database, it is observed that generally, injuries occur at higher 
frequencies than fatalities for both databases. The multiple injuries (over 100 injuries) 
occur at similar frequencies for both the RMP and the HSEES data indicating that the 
facilities in general are more risk averse in detecting and preventing multiple 
consequences but not single injuries or fatalities. Furthermore, generally societal losses 
such as fatalities mostly occur within the confines of plant facilities.  
In order to understand the ratios of different consequences resulting from incidents, 
the safety pyramids were generated for the two databases. Due to the availability of large 
number of HSEES data and because the data had a greater potential to escalate to serious 
consequence events based on the shape of the overall HSEES pyramid, the information 
from HSEES were utilized to generate safety pyramids for the different initiating causes 
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of failures leading to incidents. As seen in Figs. 31-37, the safety pyramids indicate that 
for any accident, under suitable conditions, the resulting consequences could escalate 
into more serious consequences if the factors leading to the incidents were not 
indentified and rectified in timely manner. Among the safety pyramids generated for the 
different causes for failures in the HSEES database, the safety pyramid for natural and 
unknown causes were more serious or ―risky‖ because of the greater potential for 
consequences to result in serious or adverse consequences under suitable conditions.  
Pair-wise correlation and regression analysis were also performed on data 
reported in both databases. The individual correlations performed between different 
consequences indicated that no single factor could sufficiently describe its effect on 
other consequence. Only in some cases such as the total number of evacuations with the 
number of people hospitalized and treated and, major injuries per year with minor 
injuries per year from RMP data the correlations were statistically significant based on 
the PASW study. Similarly, from the HSEES database, number of fatalities with number 
of major injuries, fatalities with minor injuries, fatalities with number of evacuations 
and, number of major injuries with number of minor injuries were statistically 
significant based on the PASW study indicating the existence of relationship between 
those consequences.  
For understanding the collective relationship of lower tier consequences with that 
of fatality, the statistical regression analyses were performed using PASW software for 
data reported in both databases. Collectively, the lower steps of the pyramid have 
statistically significant relationship with the top level of the safety pyramid, which is in 
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agreement with the domino theory of Heinrich. If the domino theory of Heinrich were 
utilized, then the number of fatalities and major injuries (societal losses) could 
significantly be decreased by exclusively focusing on decreasing the number of low 
consequence occurrences such as evacuations. Hence, facilities and regulatory agencies 
tracking the different consequences could utilize the regression equations pertaining to 
the two databases to estimate the propensity of accident consequences to result in 
potential high-risk incidents or high-consequence events. RMP data could specifically 
be utilized by all US facilities covered under the RMP rule, especially the petroleum 
industry and HSEES data could be utilized in general by all US chemical facilities 
especially those housing hazardous substances.  
Fig. 38 shows a novel concept of representing losses using three dimensional 
representation of incident risk analysis, property damage and type of incident 
consequences. Such representations connecting important information will prove to be 
useful to see the interrelationship between important factors mined from the database. In 
this figure, if the risk aversion (RA) is considered to be increased from RA5 to RA1, 
with RA1 representing the most risky scenario consequences, the RA could be related to 
the frequency of FN-curve HSE tolerable criterion as follows: RA5 <10E-06, 10E-06  
 RA4  10E-05, 10E-05   RA3  10E-04, 10E-04   RA2   10E-03 and RA1   10E-03. 
It is seen from Fig. 38 that as the seriousness of the risk aversion increases, the 
consequences in terms of the average property damage loss per incident reported in 
HSEES also increases. The property damage loss for RA1 incident with potential 
fatalities could result in approximately $8mil. 
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Figure 38.  Three dimensional representation of incident risk analysis, property 
damage and type of incident consequences 
 
4.3. Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory  
In chemical engineering, the use of expected utility theory and application of 
game theory concepts is a novel approach. The first step is the quantitative risk analysis 
using QRA to estimate the different portfolio scenarios inclusive of expected tangible 
losses and societal losses and, converting the expected tangible consequences in 
monetary form (Prem, Ng and Mannan, 2010). Performing a QRA for preventing 
catastrophes would provide the account of the different types of equipment and areas of 
the process plants which are more susceptible to failure or damage to cause an extreme 
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incident (Prem, Ng, Sawyer et al., 2010; Pasman et al., 2009). The next step is to assess 
the conflict between the risk of scenario options and the safety measures to be 
implemented for risk mitigation (or risk reduction) for the deduced scenarios. 
Expected utility principles could be most effectively utilized to decide which 
design alternative is most preferred in the presence of competing design alternatives. For 
each of the different portfolios, the different criteria have to be evaluated and estimates 
must then be compared. For understanding how the different criteria interact to provide 
optimality for that particular option or portfolio, game theory concepts can be utilized by 
choosing dominant criteria among the multi-criteria. The preferred is to utilize the Nash 
equilibrium method for achieving multi-criteria equilibrium solution for each design or 
portfolio option. Nash equilibrium would provide the ideal solution of the multi-criteria 
problem treated as a game involving strategic players (different criteria with different 
strategies for risk reduction) in which no gain is unilateral (Dixit & Skeath, 2004). In 
other words, the gain will benefit the overall portfolio performance. Once, the different 
portfolio options have an equilibrium solution, they can then be studied further for 
assessing the maximum expected utility to choose the most preferred option for a trade-
off between risk because of production and risk reduction for safety. Fig. 39 shows the 
novel decision making framework for ensuring optimum solution of most preferred risk 
is chosen by a decision maker. 
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Figure 39. Decision making framework based on risk analysis in the chemical 
process industry 
 
The problem of decision making is essentially that of evaluating the competing 
options or alternatives available and choosing the most preferred risk option. Hence, the 
different parameters to be considered for decision making should first be classified into 
representative groups. The representative groups would consist of similar parameters. 
For example, different types of equipment for one particular process could be classified 
as one representative set. Similarly, another representative set could be all intangible 
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aspects such as environmental damages, loss of possible reputation, societal risk 
aversion, possible job losses and risk tolerability of companies. Loss because of incident 
consequences such as initial setup cost, insurance cost, falling share prices of products in 
the event of major incidents could be considered another different criteria for decision 
making. While there are representative sets for expected losses, whether tangible or 
intangible, there should also be representative sets for safety systems such as active 
safety systems like safety instrumented systems and passive safety systems such as 
containment and blast wall. The representative sets should clearly be distinct in function, 
in terms of the amount of expected monetary loss and whether the representative set is 
tangible or intangible representative set. This way, all the losses estimated from QRA 
studies can all included in the decision making process. 
For each of these sets if the decision is to be made between different design 
options, either during new installation or during management of change process, then 
expected utility theory concepts should be utilized and most preferred option chosen 
based on most preferred risk. If the decision is to be made for choosing the preferred 
process for a portfolio design, among competing safety alternatives for mitigation risks 
based on QRA-VaR study recommendations, then game theory concepts can be utilized 
to understand the strategic interactions between the different representative sets.  
Usually decision analyses are based on desirability of an alternative which 
depends on attributes of parameters. In the proposed framework, the parameters are 
classified into representative sets to consider which set serves as the dominant criteria 
regarding monetary value loss, production performance level, the potential risk level of 
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portfolio scenarios and societal risk acceptance by the public. For each attribute or 
representative set which is the dominant contributor, it can be termed as the decision 
factor. For the decision factor utility functions would represent how the factor would 
contribute to the value of each alterative. Individual utility functions for different 
decision factors for each alternative would then be combined to identify the highest 
utility value as the optimum design option (Ang and Tang, 2007). Therefore, the utility 
of highest utility value would be the maximum expected utility value of all dominant 
contributor decision factors based on the representative set as shown by equation 18. 
                                    (18) 
where,                                                =  utility of representative decision factor 
      = probability of representative decision factor 
Regardless of what type of decision analysis method is used the final step has to 
be sensitivity analysis. Final step in decision analyses is to check if the option chosen is 
the most preferred option or not. Hence sensitivity analyses should be performed. Chen, 
Kilgou and Hipel (2008) provide an overview for obtaining Pareto optimality based on 
screening. Other screening techniques based on tradeoff weights, non-tradeoff weights, 
aspiration levels and data development analysis are also mentioned as methods which 
can be used subsequently after the basic Pareto optimality screening. More future study 
needs to focus on developing screening methods for EUT and GT Nash equilibrium 
solutions in application to chemical process industry safety. 
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4.3.1. Example illustrating the use of expected utility theory 
The following illustrates the use of utility to estimate the maximum utility to 
choose the most preferred option from conflicting alternatives. For each decision factor 
one utility function represents how that attribute contributes the value for overall utility. 
Thus, individual utilities are combined to estimate overall utilities for portfolios of study 
and the most optimum design option or portfolio option is selected. Here, the alternative 
with highest value for safety and production in comparing two different offshore 
platform designs is chosen as the best option. The maximum expected utility criteria 
provides more than a dollar value placed in decision making. If utilities for different 
consequences are known, uij and the probability of achieving that utility is pij, then the 
expected utility value of each alternative will be as shown in equation 19. 
E(Ui) = Sj (pij * uij), i = 1,2,3…n and j = 1,2,3…m                   (19) 
The alternative with highest expected utility is provided by the maximum expected 
utility value as shown in equation 20. 
          E(Uopt) = max (Sj (pij*uij))                                                              (20)     
 For the sake of explanation, two offshore platform designs are considered as 
conflicting portfolio options for decision making. The cost of Design A is estimated at 
$10mil and design B is estimated at $12mil. The annual height of wave as described by 
Ang (1990) is assumed to be 30m high with a covariance of 0.2. If the wave height is 
greater than 40m for design A and greater than 44m for design B, then the platforms 
could collapse. It is assumed that the cost of installation of design A is $10mil and 
design B is $12mil. In case of the collapse of design A the company will lose $60mil and 
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for design B the loss is $65mil. If the probabilities for collapse, C, and platforms being 
intact, I, from the wave height distribution are adopted from Ang (1990), then the 
following decision tree shown in Fig. 40 could result.  
 
Figure 40. Decision tree for collapse and intact scenarios for two platform designs 
 
If lognormal distribution is assumed and probabilities for platform collapsing and 
remaining intact are calculated for both designs, then the following values would result. 
PCA of design A collapse: P(H>40) = ln40-ln30)/0.2] =  z
PIA of design A intact: P(H<40) = 1- P(H>40) = 0.924 
Similarly, 
PCB of design B collapse: P(H>44) = ln44-ln30)/0.2] =  z
PIB of design B intact: P(H<44) = 1- P(H>44) = 0.972 
 127 
If it is further assumed that average range of fatalities for design A collapsing is (10, 5) 
and for design B is (10, 3) and, (0, 0) for structure remaining intact for both cases, then 
the expected utility based on work by Ang(1990) for both cases are calculated as shown. 
E[UA] =  (UAi * PAi) = [uCA * PCA + uIA * PIA] 
E[UB] =  (UBi * PBi) = [uCB * PCB + uIB * PIB] 
where, uCA = E[1-.004 XAC – 0.005 E(N2AC)]  
and,     uCB = E[1-.004 XAB – 0.005 E(N2AB)]  
E[XAC] = 60mil + 10mil = 70mil 
E[N2AC] = E[NAC]2 + Var(NAC) = 102 + 52 = 125 
E[XBC] = 65mil + 12mil = 77mil 
E[N2BC] = E[NBC]2 + Var(NBC) = 102 + 32 = 109 
Hence, E[UA] = 0.895 and E[UB] = 0.929 
From the results of the example, design B is chosen because it provides the 
greatest expected utility and is the best risky option of choice. However, it is interesting 
to note from this example that it is not always sufficient to estimate expected monetary 
values by placing some weight to account for societal loss. Modeling societal losses to 
be included in EUT is more complex. Hence emphasis must be placed in developing 
better workable models for utilizing intangibles based on societal risks for decision 
making. Furthermore, more studies need to be done in order to merge the criterion for 
societal risk along with the expected monetary loss based on societal risk perception (or 
risk aversion).  
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4.3.2. Example to illustrate the use of game theory 
Fig. 41 shows the illustrative game for understanding the concepts of game 
theory in application to Wimbledon tennis final match. This is an extended 
schematization of the simple example of tennis match provided by Dixit and Skeath 
(2004). If the outcome of the Wimbledon final match is to be determined the strengths 
and weaknesses of all the players are to be assessed against each other as per the 
schedule of play. As the matches progress only the best players would advance further 
towards to the final match.  
Each match in itself would consist of sets and each set has its game points. The 
outcome of each match played between two players at a time can be estimated based on 
track record of the individual players and assessing the pair-wise interaction of the 
players at each game on to each sets and ultimately to winning each match. As the best 
players advance towards playing the final match, the number of players also decreases in 
number. Only one player will ultimately win the Wimbledon match. When there are 
many players in the initial matches prior to the quarter finals, all players can essentially 
be grouped as those with exceptional players who are top seeded in world tennis ranking 
based on previous wins and individual histories. Thus one can estimate that most likely 
the top seed players might enter the quarter finals. The entire process can be modelled 
utilizing game theory model to choose a favourite player to win the Wimbledon finals.  
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Figure 41. Utilizing game theory principles to solve a complex tennis match 
 
Analogously, different attributes that constitute the operation of the complex 
plants and historical incidents or near-misses could be accounted for based on 
probability and consequence assessments for different deviating scenarios that have the 
capacity to cause major incidents. Based on reliability data of safety systems and the cost 
of reducing risks, the best option or the most preferred option could be chosen for 
optimum solution for abating the risk loss and adopting appropriate safety measures.  
Similar to the principles of winning the tennis final, the same pattern can be 
adopted to consider strategic interactions of process operations by modeling them as 
adversarial risk games. This pattern would be science based because of quantitative risk 
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analysis and VaR measures. Utilizing game theory principles to understand the complex 
chemical portfolio strategic interactions is schematized in Fig. 42.  
 
 
Figure 42. Utilizing game theory principles to understand the complex chemical 
portfolio strategic interactions 
 
 A recent report by the World Economic Forum (2010) provides a map on the 
interaction of different countries from an economic perspective and for understanding 
systematic vulnerabilities for the purpose of managing risks. Borrowing this idea, the 
interaction of different operations and the key parameters for decision making in the 
chemical process industry, a risk interconnection map could be developed for individual 
portfolios. This would provide information about real values of losses (for both tangible 
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and intangible assets) for trading-off between risky scenario versus the dollar amount 
needed to be spent to mitigate the risk for process safety. A conceptual risk 
interconnection map portraying some possible representative sets for choosing most 
preferred risk option is provided in Fig. 43.  
 
Figure 43. Illustrative risk interconnection map for chemical process industry 
 
The  final  desired  result  from  performing  calculations  based  on  game theory 
principles, including the different competing alternatives, is to generate the best response 
curves.  Fig. 44  shows  an  example best response curve for two alternatives which is the 
loss  to  the  company if the quantified process risk is realized into a catastrophic incident 
and the cost for mitigating the potential risks in form of safety cost. The ideal solution of 
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the best response curve would be the Nash equilibrium point, which should be further 
studied to be properly utilized in the chemical process industry. 
 
 
Figure 44. Nash equilibrium approach for the solution of adversarial game in 
chemical process industry 
 
In decision making using EUT, the real decision scenarios problems are 
characterized by many attributes and placing values on all the attributes is very difficult. 
Hence, reaching the maximum of the overall utility model considering all attributes is 
demanding. Hence, trade-offs must be assessed by properly constructing the one 
dimensional expected monetary value function and combine that with systematic pattern 
of values assigned to all other attributes and then comparing the utilities (Keeney & 
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Raiffa, 1976). In order to study utility functions in chemical process industries, 
systematic methods must be developed to obtain patterns which can be utilized to 
understand effects of attributes such as societal risks, environmental damage, company 
risk acceptability and public risk tolerance. Therefore, game theory principles can be 
useful for understanding of the strategic interactions between different attributes. Much 
research is needed towards this endeavour and, to include decision making models in 
simulation and consequence modelling software packages. Once this pattern is set, it will 
be very useful for effectively mitigating risks in the process industry.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This section provides the overview of the research along with specific 
conclusions based on the results from case study as well as general conclusions from the 
overall study from the proposed novel research methodology. Based on the conclusions 
suitable future work is also proposed in this section. 
5.1. Research Conclusions 
From this study we conclude that the comprehensive judgments of all the risks 
and losses for the business decision making should entail the analysis of the overall 
results of all possible incident scenarios. VaR is most suitable as an overall measure for 
many scenarios and large number of portfolio assets. The proposed novel methodology 
aids in better understanding the risk and decision making for an entire portfolio along 
with the inclusion of societal impact.   
Prediction of tangible and intangible risks and their inclusion in the economic 
analysis is significantly important while making business decisions or choosing between 
competing alternatives for production and safety. Cost benefit analysis supports sound 
decision making for larger portfolio investments. The background, the theory and 
methodology and the economic analysis are proposed. QRA and VaR as a combined 
quantitative analysis tool is stated as the bridge between engineers who quantify the risks 
and the management who make business decisions based on the estimated risks (Fang, 
Ford and Mannan, 2004). The current work builds on the work done by Fang et al., 
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(2004), which proposes the combination of LOPA and QRA for improved risk-informed 
decision making. 
The comprehensive judgments of all the risks and losses for the business decision 
making should entail the analysis of the overall results of all possible incident scenarios 
of a portfolio. Besides estimating the harm to people using FN-curves, graphically 
representing the monetized asset damage losses also aids in decision making to judge 
business prospects. Hence, F$-curves are constructed analogous to FN-curves, by 
constructing curves of cumulative frequency vs. monetary damage. Finally, these 
information add value in identifying the most serious types of incidents, the critical 
equipment in need of safety measures and selecting of the most preferred option among 
different design alternatives.  
Prediction of tangible and intangible risks and their inclusion in the economic 
analysis is significantly important while making business decisions or choosing between 
competing (or conflicting) alternatives for saving costs, improving safety, increasing 
production and enhancing the life cycle of processes and plant assets. In this research, 
the importance of studying major incidents and monetizing the assets are stressed, the   
methodology for making business decisions from the economic analysis is developed 
and the methodology is demonstrated by applying it on case studies. For this purpose, 
credible scenarios and their incident outcome frequencies were first developed. The 
quantified portfolio risks were classified as tangible risks and intangible risks.  The 
tangible risks were monetized and the expected loss using VaR were calculated. The VaR 
values and the economic losses enabled concluding that the column, full bore line 
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rupture and the reboiler are the critical assets for risk mitigation in the plant. Societal 
Risk model were developed to account for intangible risk. FN-curve and F$-curve were 
generated according to the consequences of the potential scenario risks. 
Societal Impact by incidents increases sharply with the total number of victims 
and the devastation of the plant. Societal or group risk curve provides a measure of this 
disruption (i.e., societal impact). A suitable representation of societal risk is FN-curves 
(Evans and Verlander, 1997). Hirst (1998) has referred to FN-curves as important for the 
assessment of risks to populations from hazardous installations. FN-curve is the 
frequency of exceedance curve which is plotted with the values of the cumulative 
frequencies, F versus N or more fatalities (HSE, 2003). FN-curves are valuable tools that 
also outline certain tolerability of risks as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. The criterion for 
tolerability is based on the perception of risk.  
The application of UK-HSE criterion lines provide additional guidelines for 
decision making along with the consideration of economic asset losses. FN-curves and 
F$-curves can be correlated and this would be very beneficial for understanding the 
trends in historical accidents in the U.S. chemical process industry. Continuous risk 
estimation could provide more refined values for decision making. Plant specific 
information of availability of equipment could better predict losses in terms of 
accounting for repeated occurrence of low and medium incidents in one year.   
The FN-curves and F$-curves were utilized to predict the expected number of 
fatalities per year values for incidents. Once the suitable safety measures are adopted, the 
VaR value can be recalculated to analyze the benefits (if any) of adopting certain safety 
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or mitigation strategies. Finally, FN-curves and F$-curves were drawn for the entire 
portfolio and their trends compared. Based on this study it can be concluded that FN-
curves and F$-curves can be collated. This would be useful to generate FN-curves and 
F$-curves for all U.S. major incidents and world-wide catastrophes, to estimate the 
frequencies of occurrence of the historical incidents and understand the general profile 
of the historical catastrophic incidents. 
In this work, the two databases namely the EPA-RMP and the HSEES databases 
having different criteria for reporting were studied. A total of 2,623 RMP data points for 
a period of 1994 to 2009 and approximately 33,000 HSEES data points for a period of 
1996 to 2004, were analyzed to understand the number of incidents reported annually 
and the type of incidents reported along with their consequences and their initiating 
causes for failure. The different types of consequences were utilized for the generation 
of the safety pyramids similar to the one proposed by Heinrich. Safety pyramids were 
also generated for consequences resulting from the different initiating causes for failure 
leading to incidents as reported in the HSEES. Pair-wise correlation between the 
consequences and multiple regression analysis were performed to understand the 
existence of relationships between the different tiers (consequences) of the safety 
pyramids. 
The analysis from the database information will provide valuable insight to 
measure the proportions between fatalities, major injuries, minor incidents, equipment 
damage, societal losses (societal risks), evacuations and shelter-in-place. If appropriate 
risk mitigation measures for improving safety are adopted based on the low consequence 
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societal losses such as evacuations, the chances for reducing societal risks with greater 
consequences can be improved because it provides the necessary tools for monitoring 
accident consequences in plants. The safety pyramids generated could be effectively 
utilized by companies to prevent major incident consequences as it provides a measure 
of historical incident consequences in the process industry. From this study it can be 
concluded that there is a statistical relationship between the different consequence tiers 
of the safety pyramid. Additionally, there is a relationship between different tiers of 
consequences based on HSEES database study. Further, for both the databases the ratio 
between the different tiers is different from the ratio proposed by Heinrich. This could be 
because of the criterion for reporting in the RMP database and because of newer types of 
processes in the chemical industry than when safety pyramid ratios were first proposed.  
The accident ratios along with information about the low consequences or the 
"near misses" at the base of the triangles offer preventive opportunities for improving 
safety in order to prevent low incident consequences from escalating to more serious 
consequences such as fatality and major injury. Furthermore, facilities and regulatory 
agencies tracking the different consequences could utilize the regression equations to 
estimate the potential for more serious accident consequences by studying the low risk 
incidents or low severity of consequences. RMP data analyses could specifically be 
utilized by all facilities covered under the RMP rule as well as particularly by the 
petroleum industry. The HSEES database analyses could be utilized in general by all 
chemical facilities and particularly those housing hazardous substances.  
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In the presence of newer more complex processes emerging, newer risks could 
surface, making studies such as this, invaluable to learn more about the chemical 
industry incidents and seek incentives to better understand the profile of incidents. While 
this work is comprehensive and provides information about the trends in process 
operations in both chemical and petroleum industry, the following limitations exist: 
(i)  More number of years of data are needed from both databases in order to     
establish the industry trends more concretely. This study was limited to about 15 year 
data from RMP database and 8 year data from HSEES database. 
 (ii) The detailed description of the type of equipment that actually failed along 
with further information about the mode of failure of the equipment are not provided in 
either database. This valuable information, if solicited, can provide information for 
improving process safety, for increasing equipment reliability and for more precisely 
conducting accident investigations. 
(iii) HSEES data does not have the actual number of people sheltered-in-place as 
is the case in RMP in addition to the number of evacuees. The actual near-miss 
information in facilities is also unavailable from both databases. If near-miss information 
are collected, the entire safety pyramid proposed by Heinrich can be compared and more 
complete accident investigation would be made possible, which could significantly aid 
in preventing future incidents. 
(iv) The actual number of employees working in a facility and the number of 
hours worked are not provided in either database. This information along with more 
accurate description of the incidents and the description of the initiating cause of failure, 
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could be useful to generate true group risk curves such as FN-curves like the ones 
generated by UK HSE or the Dutch TNO. True FN-curves would enable management 
and regulators to more completely understand the actual societal risk trends of US 
facilities.  
From database mining it can be seen that there is a need for initiating better 
reporting of incidents along with more incident description by the companies to 
regulatory agencies. Common knowledge sharing of incidents and their resulting 
consequences throughout the US process industry could benefit the facilities to establish 
better emergency preparedness measures and employ appropriate training of plant 
workers and local emergency responders. Monitoring of incident root causes and 
investigating the causes for near-misses alike can help improve the safety program of 
facilities and process industry. Government agencies can use this information to regulate 
certain types of chemical processing and hence promote safer work environments in 
process industry. 
In this work the importance of utilizing decision analysis techniques and game 
theory in the chemical process industry has been emphasized and a conceptual 
framework is provided to arrive at decision analysis based on quantitative risk analysis 
for improving safety and preventing major catastrophes. Given the different contributing 
factors present during decision making and the vast amount of information with which to 
make less subjective decisions, reaching the maximum of the overall utility model 
considering all attributes is a daunting task. Other industries are effectively utilizing 
decision making analysis techniques. Much research is needed towards this endeavour in 
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the chemical process industry. Nevertheless, decision theory, concepts of expected utility 
theory and game theory principles can be utilized for providing decision makers with the 
effective tools to choose the most preferred risk option from conflicting portfolio 
options. 
Despite the limitations, this work lays the groundwork for harnessing databases 
to understanding profile of incidents and also for generating societal risk information as 
lagging metrics to be included along with leading indicators to form risk metrics for risk 
decision making in the chemical process industry. 
5.2. Future Work 
(i)   An important factor to consider in the research is the domino effect. 
Domino effect in chemical process industry refers to the damage or failure of equipment 
and its resultant effect because of the generated static overpressure and radiant heat 
energy. Structural damage and subsequent loss of containment leading to possible 
explosion could exacerbate the societal consequences both within and outside the plant 
facility. The resulting economic loss due to accounting of the domino effect damage 
could be varying from losses estimated otherwise.  
(ii)     Continuous risk estimation could provide more refined values for decision 
making. Plant specific information of availability of equipment could better predict 
losses in terms of accounting for repeated occurrence of low and medium consequence 
incidents in one year.  
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(iii)    Include market fluctuation values to estimate the VaR to include actual 
market fluctuations and how loss of production because of major catastrophes could also 
affect the maximum expected losses in addition to plant asset values. 
(iv) The company tolerability criteria and the societal risk aversion should be 
correlated to understand the relationship which could help estimate the risk acceptability 
in US process industries. 
(v) FN-curves and F$-curves can be correlated to estimate frequency of 
occurrences of major historical incidents and then generate FN-curves for those 
incidents, which would be very useful for process industry worldwide. 
(vi) The concepts of decision analyses present here can be further studied to 
be applied in a chemical process industry setting to enable better decision making for 
improving safety. 
(vii) More information about US hazardous chemical incidents and near-
misses is needed to be collected in order to generate true FN-curves based on 
information about the actual number of facilities in HSEES and the actual number of 
employees working in the facilities where incidents occur. Better information reporting 
and collection is required for understanding the incident trends in process industries. 
Incident reporting around the world must be more transparent for more in-depth 
information about incidents.  
(viii) Software currently utilized for designing and optimizing plant operations 
should be embedded with economic evaluation capacity and decision analyses 
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information as guidelines for choosing optimum solutions for complex processes or 
portfolios. 
(ix) Much research is needed in developing workable models for using 
decision theory principles of expected utility theory and game theory in the chemical 
process industry setting.  
(x) Better sensitivity analysis methods must be developed for ensuring that 
the ―most preferred‖ portfolio option chosen is indeed the best possible risk trade-off 
between production and process safety in consideration of intangible assets. 
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